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Volume 45 Spring 1980 Number 2
THE "NEW CHECKS": THRIFT INSTITUTION




For more than a century the community of banking institutions in the
United States has consisted of entities offering differentiated banking
services. During the 1800s and early 1900s the principal endeavors of com-
mercial banks were the extension of commercial credit, the purchase of bills
and notes at discount, the issue of specie, and the offering of corporate
and personal demand deposit accounts. What have come to be called
"thrift'u institutions-mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations
and, more recently, credit unions-on the other hand, restricted their pur-
view. to personal savings accounts, consumer loans, and the home mortgage
market. The distinction between thrifts and commercial banks began to
shade, a bit during and after the depression as commercial banks began
cultivating the market for personal loans, savings accounts, and home
mortgages. Nevertheless, the differences between these two types of bank-
ing institutions with respect to the nature of services they offered largely
survived through the decade of the 1960s. The widespread and intensive
-*Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law; J.D., Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1967.
-The author wishes to express special appreciation to Charles Lempesis, J.D.,
Gonzaga University School of Law, 1979, a colleague and friend, for his research
assistance, innovative analysis, and general collaboration. The author also owes
a particular debt of gratitude to Ralph Swoboda, General Counsel to I.C.U.
Services, the technical assistance arm of the credit union trade organization, Credit
Union National Association. Thanks is further due Keith Trefry, a colleague in
the thrift banking community, and Professor Fairfax Leary, the original reporter
of Article 4 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
1. The nation's financial intermediaries are comprised of commercial banks,
life insurance companies, finance companies, pension funds, investment com-
panies, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions.
Because the latter three historically developed as institutions for savings, and are
nonstock enterprises whose earnings inure to members, they have come to be
known in the argot of the banking trade as "thrift institutions" or "thrifts."
199
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marketing by thrift institutions of "checking" services during the 1970s
may significantly affect this historical distinction. Starting in 1974, de-
posits subject to "check-like" instruments at thrift institutions multiplied
from an insignificant amount to more than $3.4 billion by July, 1979.2
Because many thrift institutions have been given the authority to create
these deposits only in the last year or two, that figure appears destined
to increase geometrically.
The growth of thrift institution "checkable deposits" has been an un-
anticipated phenomenon caused by market place pressures and acquiesced
in by regulatory, legislative, and judicial bodies. The law of negotiable in-
struments as codified in Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code probably did not foresee this development. Those articles, particu-
larly Article 4, were drafted with a view toward the customary bank check
which has been in use in this country for nearly two hundred years. To-
gether, Articles 3 and 4 provide an integrated, tightly knit set of rules
governing check issuance, collection, and payment; they carefully define
the relationship between a customer and the bank at which he maintains
his checking account. The concern examined in this article is whether
this body of law can accommodate thrift institution "new checks." The
salient inquiries are: (1) is a thrift institution "check-like" instrument
negotiable and, more specifically, is it a demand item?; and (2) does a
drawee thrift institution qualify as a "bank" as that term is defined by
the Code for Articles 3 and 4 purposes?
The precise nature of thrift institution third-party payment instru-
ments is examined at length later in this article.8 For introductory pur-
poses, the departure point is a brief analysis of the principal new "check-
like"4 instruments and a review of the market place pressures that gave
impetus to their evolution. The balance of the article is divided into four
sections. The first section surveys the historical development of thrift
institutions; an analysis of the differences and likenesses of thrifts and
commercial banks is necessary to answer the question of what constitutes
a bank for Articles 3 and 4 purposes..8 The second section reviews the
2. Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H-6, "Money Stock Measures"
(Oct. 25, 1979). The figure for deposits in thrift institutions earning interest but
subject to "check" has not yet reached statistical significance when compared to
total demand deposits in the nation's banks, which were estimated at $269.8
billion in July, 1969. Id. Nonetheless, the rapid growth rate of "new check" "check-
able deposits" indicates that the deposits soon will become statistically as well
as conceptually important.
3. See text accompanying notes 203-296 infra.
4. The terms "checkable deposits" and "check-like instruments" have been
used by the Federal Reserve Board to refer to those new instruments, and therefore
are adopted by the author. See Federal Reserve System Request for Comments on
Federal Reserve Handling of Noninterest Bearing Negotiable Orders of With-
drawal (NINOWs) and other "Check-Like" Payment Instruments, 44 Fed. Reg.
24,929 (1979).
5. The term is defined in the "General Definitions" part of the Code as
"any person engaged in the business of banking." U.C.C. § 1-201 (4).
[Vol. 45
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development of what has come to be called a "check." The term is as-
signed a simple and inclusive definition by the Code;8 nonetheless, a
brief examination of the evolution of negotiable instruments called
"checks" is useful in determining whether a thrift institution "check-like"
instrument satisfies that simple Code definition. The third section surveys
the recent administrative, judicial, and legislative activity that has at-
tended the growth of thrift checkable deposits. Finally, section four ana-
lyzes the applicability of Articles 3 and 4 to the "new checks," and focuses
on whether a "new check" is a negotiable demand item as well as whether
a thrift institution offering checkable deposits should be considered a
"bank" for purposes of Articles 3 and 4.
Most "new checks" are of two kinds: credit union "share drafts" and
mutual savings bank or savings and loan association "negotiable orders
of withdrawal" (NOWs). Their features are functions of the banking
capabilities of the respective thrift institutions. A credit union share draft
is a three-party instrument similar in appearance to an ordinary check,
except that it carries on its face the identification of a commercial bank
through which it is payable.7 Credit unions do not have direct access
to the Federal Reserve collection system; they are not eligible for member-
ship in the Federal Reserve System and cannot gain access to that system
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Since the collection
of the item through the Federal Reserve collection system is a practical
necessity, credit unions offering share draft accounts usually collaborate
with commercial banks that do have that access. These institutions serve
as "payable through" banks.
A negotiable order of withdrawal is in appearance even more similar
to a check. It customarily is a simple three-party instrument reflecting the
account-holding thrift institution as drawee.8 Unlike a credit union, a
mutual savings bank or a savings and loan association can gain access to
6. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) provides in part: "A writing which complies with the
requirements of this section is ... (b) a 'check' if it is a draft drawn on a bank
and payable on demand."
7. A "payable through" bank serves as a collecting bank through which
presentment is made to the drawee, and is not responsible for payment of the in-
strument. See U.C.C. § 3-120. "Payable through" instruments have for some time
been widely used by insurance companies to settle claims. See H. BAILEY, BRADY ON
BANK CHEcKs § 1.15 (1979). They are also utilized for corporate dividend pay-
ments and, to a limited degree, payroll checks. AmERICAN B- N ERs ASSOCIATION,
PAYABLE THROUGH DRArrs 13 (1975).
8. About half of this country's mutual savings banks that offer NOW ac-
counts, particularly those in the eastern states, use a commercial "payable through"
bank, often a commercial bank that is wholly-owned by groups of mutuals. Con-
versation with Jack Rubinson, Director of Research, National Association of Mu-
tual Savings Banks (Nov. 26, 1979). Savings and loan associations that offer NOW
accounts, on the other hand, customarily do not utilize "payable through" banks,
but rather furnish NOW customers with simple three party instruments drawn
on the depository savings and loan. Conversation with R. Lamar Brantley, As-
sistant Director, Funds Transfer Research, U.S. League of Savings Associations
(Nov. 26, 1979).
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the federal collection system. While mutuals are eligible for Federal Re-
serve System membership,9 they commonly participate in the collection
system as FDIC insured nonmember banks through membership in regional
clearinghouse associations. Savings and loan associations, which are not
eligible for membership or FDIC insured nonmember status, usually gain
access to the collection system through the vehicle of a correspondent com-
mercial bank.
In the case of both share drafts and negotiable orders of withdrawal,
the accounts on which the instruments are drawn are interest bearing10
savings deposits. 1 By nearly uniform statute and regulation, such a sav-
ings account must be subject to the right of the depository institution to
require advance notice of withdrawal, usually thirty or sixty days.' 2 Con-
sequently, such thrift institution accounts subject to share draft or NOW
withdrawals by definition are not demand accounts.
Generally, the impetus for the development of thrift institution check-
like programs was provided by the competition with commercial banks
for savers' funds. The NOW account was the marketing brainchild of
Ronald Haselton, a banker who spent his career with commercial banks.13
The single most important moving force, however, was probably the 1972
amendment of 12 U.S.C. § 492 which permitted direct electronic deposit
of recurring payments, such as social security benefits or paychecks, 14 in
financial intermediaries of the recipient's choice. The amendment produced
a double effect. First, thrift institutions were required to develop the neces-
sary electronic funds transfer technology in order to receive the direct
electronic deposits and, for electronic transfer purposes, were assigned in-
dividual bank collection routing and transit numbers.' 5 The development
of that electronic funds transfer capability and the assignment of Federal
9. 12 U.S.C. § 333 (1976).
10. The phrase "savings account" is used here in the more limited sense
that it is an account subject to the depository institutions' right to require ad-
vance notice of withdrawal. In a broader lay sense, the phrase customarily re-
fers to accounts that are not transaction accounts, which these accounts of
course are.
11. Technically, a credit union customer savings vehicle is a share account,
different from an ordinary savings account in that the customer receives dividends
calculated periodically, rather than a predetermined level of interest. The share
account confers membership status on the customer, who acquires in the credit
union an equity ownership subordinate to creditors on liquidation.
12. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (b) (1) (1976) and 12 C.F.R. § 545.4 (1979),
requiring federally chartered savings and loan associations to reserve the right
to require 30 days advance notice of withdrawals, and 13 C.F.R. § 329.1 (e) (iii)
(1979), imposing that requirement on mutual savings banks insured by FDIC. The
Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration is authorized by 12
U.S.C. § 1758 (1976) to prepare a standard set of bylaws, which must be adopted
by federally chartered credit unions; those Standard Form Bylaws reserve to
federal credit unions the right to require 60 days advance notice of withdrawal.
13. Riordan, NOW Accounts: A Legal Analysis, XL LEG. BULL. 1, 2 (1974).
14. 31 U.S.C. § 492 (d) (1976); 31 C.F.R. § 210 (1978).
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Reserve collection system forwarding numbers made entry into the na-
tional check collection system significantly easier. Second, the advent of
a direct deposit system had a pronounced effect on the competitive stance
of thrift institutions vis-a-vis commercial banks. Thrift institutions were
forced to either develop more efficient and marketable means for cus-
tomers to "access" their deposit accounts, or face the likelihood of a sub-
stantial outflow of funds to commercial banks that could offer that con-
venient access through a conventional checking account. While that po-
tential outflow of funds might not have threatened the survival of thrift
institutions, it would have substantially narrowed their market penetration,
and perhaps relegated them to a permanent inconsequential status among
the nation's financial institutions. The result was, of course, that thrifts
undertook to enter the "checkable deposit" market. 16
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE BANKING INSTITUTIONS
A. Mutual Savings Banks
Commercial banks in this country initially were organized to facilitate
commerce through the granting of business loans, offering of demand de-
posits, printing of specie, and the like, 17 and not to assist small borrowers
or savers. An early need existed for financial institutions that could offer
those limited and less remunerative services. The Philadelphia Savings
Fund Society and The Provident Institution for Savings (Boston), both
nonstock ventures to afford small savers a secure depository, were organized
in 1.816 to fill that need.' 8 During the ensuing fifty years, mutual savings
bank growth in the eastern seaboard states was considerable; by 1900 there
were some 626 mutuals, 19 clustered predominately in the northeastern
United States. Perhaps because the nation's industrial growth occurred
first ini the northeast, and led to the development there of a wage earner
Class "that did not exist in the predominately agricultural west and south,
mutual savings banks were, and still remain, a geographical phenomenon.
Of the seventeen jurisdictions that currently charter mutual savings banks,
only six are outside of the northeastern or east-central United States.20
The structural organization of mutual savings banks has remained
16. It should be made explicit at the outset that what is involved with "new
checks" is access by a "demand" instrument to a "non-demand" deposit account.
17. J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON BANKING LAw 34-37 (1976).
18. W. WELSOING, MILTUAL SAVINGS BANKS 8 (1968).
19. Id. at 41.
20. States chartering mutual savings banks are Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, Washing-
ton, and Alaska. The geographic focus of mutual savings banks can be seen even
more dearly with an examination of their location and assets: As of December 31,
1978, of some 465 mutual savings banks with aggregate deposits of $142.7 billion,
444 with deposits of $137.4 billion were located in the northeastern or east-central
states. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 1979 National Fact Book
of Mutual Savings Banking, Table 6 at 14, Table 18 at 20 (1979).
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fairly constant from its inception-mutual ownership by depositors, man-
agement directed by a self-perpetuating board of trustees2 1-but the finan-
cial function has steadily expanded from the initial somewhat moralistic
emphasis on member-depositor self-reliance through thrift. Mutuals grad-
ually moved into the mortgage market, and by 1900 mortgage investments
represented the predominant asset of mutual savings banks.22 Personal
demand deposit accounts were an added financial service of some mutuals
in the 1800s and are now offered by 228 savings banks in 10 states. 23 The
number of services has continued to grow to the point where savings banks
now offer a full panoply of personal banking services.24
Savings banks were exclusively creatures of state law until very
recently, a fact that may account for their relatively unfettered expansion
of services. By depression-era legislation, however, mutual savings banks
were made eligible for membership in the Federal Reserve System 25 and
for insured status under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.26
While few mutual savings banks have opted for the former, the majority
have chosen FDIC insured status2 7 and the FDIC regulatory authority that
attends that status. By a provision of the Federal Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,28 mutual savings banks
were made eligible for federal chartering2 9 and thus have been accorded
access to the dual banking system that has been available to commercial
banks, credit unions, and savings and loan associations at least since the
1930s. Although savings banks are geographically focused and fairly small
in number, individually they tend to be large compared to other finan-
cial intermediaries, with an average holding in excess of $340 million in
assets.2 0
B. Savings and Loan Associations
Savings and loan associations evolved slightly later than mutual sav-
ings banks, and initially filled a restricted function by providing member
21. J. WHITE, supra note 17, at 37.
22. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, supra note 20, Table 1
at 10.
23. Id., Table 26 at 23, Table 77 at 53.
24. A majority of this country's mutual savings banks are authorized the fol-
lowing banking powers or services: mortgage lending, including multi-family and
non-residential building; home improvement; personal and education loans, both
secured and unsecured; time and savings deposit accounts; sale of bank money
orders and travelers checks; safe deposit boxes; retirement accounts; and savings
bank life insurance. Id., Table 76 at 52.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 333 (1976).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1976); 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (a), (f) (1976).
27. Of the 465 mutual savings banks in this country as of December 31, 1978,
325 are FDIC insured. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, supra note
20, Table 7 at 14.
28. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 36451.
29. Id., § 1201, 92 Stat. 3710 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1462 (d) (i976)).
30. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, supra note 20, Table 1
at 10, Table 5 at 14.
(Vol. 45
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loans for dwelling construction or purchase. The first such "building so-
ciety," the Oxford Provident in Philadelphia, was formed in 1831.3 1 In
that cooperative venture, members purchased shares in the society through
regular periodic payments. When sufficient capital was raised, one of the
members was awarded a mortgage loan through a bidding process. 32 The
spread of these "building societies," or what were known until fairly
recently as "building and loan associations," was rapid. Not only did the
societies offer a service generally not provided by commercial banks, but
since the home loan function was important to the agricultural and mer-
cantile classes as well as to wage earners, "building societies" followed
population growth throughout the country. By 1900 every state and ter-
ritory had chartered such institutions. 3 Because of that geographic dis-
persal, building and loan associations expanded their savings functions
and gradually became a principal savings institution in this country, a
position they still hold.34
Federal depression-era legislation created the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board,3 5 which had federal chartering authority, and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,3 6 which offered insurance on
member deposits. Because of benefits accompanying federal chartering,
nearly half of the savings and loan institutions in this country are federally
chartered, 37 and some eighty-six percent are insured members of FSLIC.38
Savings and loan associations structurally are akin to mutual savings
banks. They are predominantly nonstock mutual enterprises owned by
members and governed by a board of directors. 39 In function, savings and
loans have tended to be more restrictive in the kinds of financial services
offered than mutual savings banks, and less aggressive in expanding that
range of services. Savings deposits and mortgage loans still constituted
eighty-two percent of the industry's liabilities and assets as of 1978.40
31. L. KENDALL, THE SAVINGS AND LomAN BusiNss 4 (1962).
32. Id.
33. J. WnrrE, supra note 17, at 42.
34. As of year end 1978, savings and loan associations held $431 billion in
savings, commercial banks held $546.3 billion, mutual savings banks some $142.6
billion, and credit unions $53 billion. United States League of Savings Associa-
tions, Savings and Loan Fact Book '79, Table 4 at 14 (1979).
35. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725, 736 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976)).
36. Id.; eligibility for federal chartering is provided in 12 U.S.C. § 1424
(1976).
37. As of December 31, 1978, 2,000 of the 4,723 savings and loan associations
in this country were federally chartered. United States League of Savings Associa-
tions, supra note 34, Table 38 at 48.
38. Id.
39. L. KENDALL, supra note 31, at 10-11. A number of savings and loan associa-
tions have, under federal and state chartering authority, adopted a "stock" rather
than a "mutual" form of organization. See 12 C.F.R. § 552 (1979). As of year
end 1978, 771 of 4,723 savings and loan associations were "stock," rather than
"mutual" organizations. L. KENDALL, supra note 31, at 50-51.
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In recent years the scope of personal banking services offered by
savings and loan associations has expanded considerably, particularly in
the fund transfer area. A few states allow ordinary demand -deposits at
savings and loans, 41 a growing number permit NOW accounts or varia-
tions on the negotiable order of withdrawal schemes, 42 and recent regula-
tions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board permit savings and loans'
operation of "remote service units"43-automated off-premise terminals
that dispense cash, accept deposits, and handle withdrawals and loan
payments.
Although savings and loan associations represent the second largest
category of financial institutions in this country, they tend to be some-
what smaller than mutual savings banks. The average association had as-
sets as of 1978 of $110 million,44 about one-third the size of the' average
mutual savings bank, but still larger than the average commercial bank.4 5
C. Credit Unions
Credit unions were relative late-comers in this country and were pat-
terned after the cooperative credit societies and "peoples banks" that
flourished in central Europe during the last half of the nineteenth cen-
tury.40 The first credit union established in the United States was La Caisse
Populaire Ste. Marie, in Manchester, New Hampshire. It was organized in
1909 to serve the savings and small loan needs of the French descendant
members of a Catholic parish.47 Although by 1920 some nine states had
adopted credit union chartering statutes, the spread of credit unions ini-
tially was slow, and there were by then fewer than 200 operating credit
unios,4 8 all quite small. In the ensuing decade, however, an additional
twenty-three states passed chartering legislation, and by 1930 there were
1,100 credit unions in this country.49 The organization in 1934 of the
Credit Union National Association, 50 a permanent credit union trade
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-182a (West Supp. 1979); ME. REv. STAT. tit.
9-B, § 761 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 390.5 (Mcxinney Supp. 1979).
42. See text accompanying notes 124-146 infra.
43. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1979).
44. United States League of Savings Associations, supra note 34, at 51.
45. There are 14,390 commercial banks in this country. 65 FED. RES. BULL.,
No. 11, Table A-19 (Nov. 1979). As of year end 1978, commercial banks had
$1.284 trillion in assets. United States League of Savings Associations, supra note
84, at 46. The average commercial bank thus had roughly $90 million in assets.
46. The cooperative credit movement had its beginning around 1850 in
Germany, and grew rapidly there and in surrounding countries. By 1913, the
number of cooperative credit societies had grown to 25,576 in Germany, 11,599 in
Austria, and over 2,000 in Italy. J. MOODY & G. FrE, THE CREDIT UNION MOVE-
MENT: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1850-1970 1-25 (1971).
47. Id. at 34-36.
48. D. MELVIN, R. DAvis & G. FISCHER, CREDIT UNIONS AND THE CREDIT
UNION INDUSTRY 12 (1977).
49. J. MOODY & G. FITE, supra note 46, at 126.
50. Id. at 180.82.
[Vol. 45
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association, and the passage that year of the Federal Credit Union Act,5 '
which provided for federal chartering by the Credit Union Division of
the Farm Credit Administration, 52 further accelerated the growth of these
institutions. By 1976 there were some 22,600 credit unions chartered by
the National Credit Union Administration and by forty-six states.5 3
Credit unions are structurally quite different from mutual savings
banks and savings and loan associations. The organization is cooperative,
rather than mutual, and while earnings in either setting eventually inure
to members, cooperative ventures are more egalitarian in character. Earn-
ings are distributed in proportion to patronage and each member has one
vote on association policy.54 From the time of the first credit societies
established in Germany in the 1840s, membership in credit unions tradi-
tionally has been restricted to associational or occupational groupings, or
to persons living in a limited geographical area.55 The restricted member-
ship field of most credit unions-sometimes referred to as the "common
bond"-is a chartering requirement of nearly all states and the National
Credit Union Administration.5 6 This, of course, has inhibited the growth
of most credit unions, with the majority remaining small and volunteer-
operated. 57 The average credit union had about $1.9 million in assets in
1976. 58 Nonetheless, there are credit unions approaching the billion dol-
lar figure in total assets, 59 and several are in the hundred million dollar
category.60
The function of credit unions traditionally has been to encourage and
facilitate member thrift. Indeed, the definition given a credit union in the
federal chartering statute asserts that function: "[A] cooperative associ-
ation . . .for the purpose of promoting thrift among its members and
creating a source of credit for provident or productive purposes." 61 Most
small volunteer-staffed credit unions offer only limited services: savings or
share accounts and small loans for personal, family, or household purposes.
The credit union trade organization in recent years has sought an expan-
sion of credit union powers, however, and the services now offered by
51. Ch. 750, § 1, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. ch. 14 (1976)).
52. Id., § 5, 48 Stat. 1217 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1755 (1976)).
53. D. MELVIN, R. DAvis & G. FIscur R, supra note 48, at 103.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Id. at 41-43.
56. Id. at 41-44. The Federal Credit Union Act requires that membership be
limited to "groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to
groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1759 (1976).
57. D. MnsvNv, R. DAvis 8 G. FISCHER, supra note 48, at 40-41, 103-105.
58. Id. at 103.
59. The Navy Federal Credit Union, Alexandria, Va., as of December 31,
1978, had assets of $765.5 million. Conversation with Rosalind Gordon, Director
of Marketing Research, Credit Union National Association (Dec. 11, 1979).
60. At the end of 1978, eight credit unions had assets in excess of $200
million. Id.
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1752 (1) (1976).
1980],
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many of the larger credit unions approximate those offered by mutual
savings banks and savings and loans, and even commercial banks with re-
gard to personal banking services.32
A comparison of thrift institutions with commercial banks requires
a cursory examination of interest rate differentials on savings deposits, a
fairly recent federal regulatory development. In 1966, Congress passed
Public Law 89-597, 63 a measure addressed to a disintermediation64 phe-
nomenon the nation's thrift institutions were experiencing. The Act gave
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board the authority to establish interest
rate ceilings on savings deposits. While the Act did not require a rate
differential for thrift institutions, it did encourage regulatory bodies to
establish such a differential so that thrift institutions might attract more
savings for mortgage lending purposes.65 The measure provided that such
interest rate limitations would be effective for a one-year period only, but
the measure has been renewed eleven times,66 and has become a semi-perma-
nent part of the banking regulatory scenery. Until summer, 1979, the dif-
ferential was .25%; thrift institutions were permitted a maximum interest
payment of 5.25% on ordinary savings deposits, and commercial banks were
permitted 5.0%. In July, 1979, each limitation was raised .25%.67 Credit
unions are not regulated with regard to dividend payments, but the most
recent figures show dividends as slightly above 6% on share accounts.
The bank regulatory measure, known for some time as Regulation Q,
appears to have an uncertain future. Adopted to stem inflationary
62. These services include: unsecured and secured loans, share accounts, sav-
ings accounts, safe deposit facilities, member life insurance, money orders, trave-
lers checks, and member financial counseling and advice. D. MELVIN, R. DAvis
& G. Frscmm, supra note 47, at 22-86. Two states, Nevada and Rhode Island,
legislatively empower state chartered credit unions to offer ordinary demand de-
posit accounts. NEv. REv. STAT. § 678.470.1 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAws § 19-21-9.1
(Supp. 1978). At least one New Hampshire credit union has been offering demand
deposit accounts for over 40 years. See La Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie v. United
States, 563 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1977).
63. Act of September 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 461, 1425 (b), and 1828 (g) (1976)).
64. The term "disintermediation" is used to describe a deleterious outflow
of funds from financial intermediaries.
65. S. REP. No. 1601, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nrws 2994, 3000-01 (to accompany H.R. 14026 which was
passed as the Act of September 21, 1966, supra note 63). The three regulatory
bodies then established interest rate limitations allowing a quarter percent favor-
able differentiation for FDIC-insured mutual savings banks and federally char-
tered savings and loan associations over member Federal Reserve Board commercial
banks and nonmember FDIC insured commercial banks. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.7, 329.7,
526.3 (1979).
66. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979) (to accompany H.R. 4986,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 6828 (1979)).
67. 44 Fed. Reg. 32,353 (1979) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 44
Fed. Reg. 32,646 (1979) (Federal Reserve Board); 44 Fed. Reg. 33,669 (1979) (Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board).
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tendencies prevalent fourteen years ago, the regulatory measure is now be-
ing accused of contributing both to inflation and to the disintermediation
thrift institutions are again experiencing. Although some in the thrift com-
munity have fought hard for the perpetuation of Regulation Q,8 the Senate
twice has passed measures to abolish it,69 and a Senate-passed bill authoriz-
ing thrift institution "new checks" provided for the phase-out of interest
level differentiation and limitation over a ten-year period."
A survey of the development and growth of thrift institutions in this
country must include an acknowledgment of the dominance of commercial
banks among the nation's financial intermediaries.71 Nonetheless, some
thrifts have exhibited remarkable staying powers,72 not only in the areas
of commercial lending and investment, but also with regard to trust powers,
correspondent services, international banking services, and personal bank-
ing services.
III. A BRIEF His-ToRY oF BANK CHECKING SERVICES
The precise origins of banking and negotiable instruments are ob-
scure; the former seems to have had its genesis in Italy,73 the latter an ac-
cretive development of the law merchant.7 4 While what we now recognize
as "checks"-demand drafts drawn on certain financial institutions-ap-
peared much later, several kinds of widely recognized contracts for the
68. S. REP. No. 368, supra note 66, at 4.
69. Id. at 3.
70. H.R. 4986, tit. I, § 110, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 6828 (1979).
71. As of year end 1978, commercial banks had assets of $1.28 trillion, savings
and loan associations held $523 billion, mutual savings banks $158 billion, and
credit unions $62 billion. United States League of Savings Associations, supra note
34, Table 37 at 46.
72. Collectors of miscellany may find it interesting that three of the original
thrift institutions survive in healthy form. The Oxford Provident was by its
nature self-terminating: as soon as all initial members had procured loans to
build houses and had repaid them, the entity was wrapped up. L. KENDALL, supra
note 31, at 5. The Philadelphia Savings Fund Society in 1979 entered its 163d
year as the largest mutual in this country, with assets of $5.38 billion, and The
Provident Institution then held some $952 million in assets. National Association
of Mutual Savings Banks, supra note 20, Table 8 at 15. La Caisse Populaire Ste.
Marie, while not the largest of this country's credit unions, began its 71st year
with a reasonably solid $30,479,000 in assets. Financial Statement to Members, La
Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie (June 30, 1979).
73. The business of banking has been traced to the Lombardy region of
Italy, in the early Ninth Century. The word "bank" probably derives from
the old Italian "banca," meaning "bench," or the germanic "bank," carrying a
similar meaning, referring to a table set up in the market place for the exchange
of money. Apparently Lombard Street in London, which in England in the
late middle ages and early renaissance was synonymous with banking, derives
its name from the Italian money changers who settled there. Paton, The Law of
Bank Checks: History and Utility, 21 BANKING L.J. 7, 8 (1904).
74. The "law merchant" was a phrase that referred to a well-established body
of legal customs, covering in addition to negotiable paper such areas as insurance,
partnership, suretyship, sales, bankruptcy, admiralty, and much of early interna-
tional law. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English
Law, 51 HARv. L. Rxv. 813, 816 (1938).
1980]
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payment of money, called "obligatory writings," were common in England
in the 1300s. 75 Partly because an early statute provided for the registration
of debts76 before certain crown officers, the so-called obligatory writings
developed a trait of rather free transferability.77 On the other hand, the
concept of negotiability-transferability of an evidence of debt with at-
tendant elimination of the obligor's defenses against remote transferees-
developed fitfully in England. In certain courts of limited jurisdiction
where the "law merchant" was enforced,78 negotiability appears to have
been accorded as early as the 1400s, 79 but the common law courts refused
to acknowledge that attribute of a promissory note even as late as 1704.80
In fact, it was not until 1758, in the well-known case of Miller v. Race,81
that such an instrument was determined to be negotiable.8 2
Well prior to the decision in Miller v. Race there appeared in com-
mercial usage in England the "inland bill of exchange,"8 3 the historical
antecedent of the current check. An instrument of limited purpose, it was
recognized as negotiable by at least two statutes as of the turn of the
eighteenth century.8 4 By the mid-eighteenth century, such a bill, at least
when drawn on the Bank of England, had come to be denominated a
"check." 85 Toward the end of that century instruments called "checks"
appeared in common usage in this country.8 6
The principal difference between this early "check" and that found to-
day was that the former had to be issued to a named payee or bearer; a
bill of exchange drawn on a bank could not be drawn to "order,"8 7 al-
though a bill not drawn on a bank could be.8 8 Part of the reason for- this
75. Four recognized types during this period were: a simple promise to pay;
a promise to pay X or his attorney; a promise to pay X or his attorney bearing
this instrument; and a promise to pay X or bearer. Id. at 817.
76. The "Statute of Merchants," 1285, 13 Edw. I, stat. 3.
77. Beutel, supra note 74, at 820.
78. During the period 1350-1550, suits on obligatory writings were within
the nearly exclusive purview of the "Staple Courts," created by the Statute of
Staples in 1353. The Staple Courts declined during the 1500s, but were replaced
in part of their function by the Admiralty Courts during that period. Both court
systems freely applied the developing law merchant. Id. at 826-34.
79. Id. at 831-32.
80. Buller v. Crips, 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (1704).
81. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (1758).
82. The case allowed recovery against the drawer by a purchaser from a
thief.
83. A "bill of exchange" of that time was a demand draft, usually payable
to the payee or bearer. An "inland bill of exchange," recognized by The Bank
of England Act, 1694, 5 W. & M., c. 20, § 29, and by The Statute of Anne, 1704, 3
& 4 Anne, c. 9, was a demand draft on which the drawer and drawee were resi-
dents of the same country.
84. The Bank of England Act, supra note 83.
85. See generally BuAw~s, LEX MERCATORIA (2d ed. 1761), cited in Paton,
supra note 73, at 12-13.
86. Paton, supra note 73, at 80-81.
87. I.e., payable according to the order or direction of the payee, necessitat-
ing his and subsequent holder's indorsement for negotiation.
88. See, e.g., Woodruff v. The Merchant's Bank, 25 Wend. 672 (N.Y. Sup.
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distinction derived from the self-interest of bankers. A bearer instrument
imposed upon a paying drawee bank only the responsibility for determin-
ing the regularity of the drawer's signature.8 9 Payment of order instru-
ments, however, involved the additional burden of determining the
genuineness of indorsements by payees and other indorsers.
In both England and the United States there understandably was pres-
sure at that time to allow the drawing of an order draft against a bank. 0
In England, order drafts were recognized by statute in 1853, but the bank-
ing community was successful in obtaining provisos immunizing banks from
liability for paying checks bearing forged indorsements.9 1 In this country
the "bearer" requirement was eliminated by the same judicial construction
that created it, and by the 1860s bank checks payable to order were
common.
9 2
From the time of the Civil War the checking system developed
rather rapidly, although even at the turn of this century one commentator
observed that there existed "a deplorable lack of system for the collec-
tion of distant checks." 93 The former Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law, drafted in 189694 and subsequently adopted by all jurisdictions, did
not touch upon check collection. In fact, the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law treated checks somewhat peripherally,95 and a unified collec-
tion mechanism was not imposed until the Federal Reserve Act of 191300
gave authority to the new Federal Reserve System to establish such a
mechanism by regulation.97
Once an adequate mechanism for collection was established, the growth
of the checking system in this country was phenomenal. By 1930, the num-
ber of checks clearing rose to 2.5 billion.98 By 1970 that number had
Ct. 1841), where the court stated: "It is essential to a check, eo nominee, or bank
draft, that it be payable to bearer, and on demand ...... Id. at 673.
89. Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
90. A paid order instrument, properly indorsed, could be used as evidence of
payment; since bearer instruments were by definition not indorsed, they could
not serve that purpose.
91. Stamp Tax Amend., 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 59, § 19.
92. Paton, supra note 73, at 85-86. Of course the paying bank had at that
time, as it has now, recourse against the party presenting the check and receiving
payment, and that person had recourse against prior indorsers, and so on back to
the person who dealt with the forger or wrongdoer.
93. Id. at 88.
94. Commissioners Prefatory Note, 5 U.L.A. at I.
95. With regard to definition, time for presentment, and effect of acceptance,
of checks, see N.I.L. §§ 185-188, 5 U.L.A. §§ 185-188.
96. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 & 226 (1976)).
97. Ch. 6, §§ 11, 13, 16, 38 Stat. 261, 262, 263, 268 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
248 (o) & 342 (1976)).
98. No precise figures for the number of checks clearing in any given year
are available, because only a fraction-between one-fourth and one-third-clear
through the Federal Reserve System. The Annual Report of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System for the following years reflect federal clearing
of 84,697,000 items in 1917 (the first year for which data was compiled), 904,975,000
in 1930, and 7,903,994,000 in 1970.
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increased to approximately 24 billion.99 In 1980 an estimated 40 billion
checks will be paid by depository institutions, 10 0 with checks indisputably
being the principal method of payment for personal as well as commer-
cial purposes.'o'
A discussion of the development of the checking system in this country
would be incomplete without a consideration of the federal prohibition on
interest-bearing demand accounts since thrift institution accounts sub-
ject to "access" by the "new checks" are in the main interest-bearing. In
1933, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act,'0 2 a federal legislative response
to the banking crisis this country was then experiencing. Principal among
the provisions of the Act was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Apparently because of a concern that the payment of in-
terest by banks on demand accounts added to their instability, the measure
included a provision forbidding those interest payments by banks that
were Federal Reserve members. 103 The provision was amended in 1935 to
prohibit interest on demand accounts on all banks that were insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.10 4 Since the provision was not
mentioned in the Conference Report to the House and Senate, 05 its legis-
lative purpose cannot be authoritatively stated. During the late 1920s and
early 1930s there evidently was considerable competition among the na-
tion's commercial banks for demand deposits, which resulted in the pay-
ment of gradually increasing interest on the deposits to attract them. As a
result, interest rates reached a level that forced banks to engage in pro-
gressively less secure investments and to lower their deposit reserves in order
to realize the earnings necessary to satisfy the high interest rates on demand
deposits then prevalent. 106 These policy goals, however, had little applica-
tion to personal demand accounts.' 07
99. See note 98 supra.
100. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, A PROPOSAL rOR INTERBANK TRuN-
CATION 15 (1979).
101. R. SPEIDEL, R. SuMmms &c J. WHIrE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMER-
CIAL AND CONSUMER LAw 1275 (1974).
102. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168 (1933) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 263 (1976)).
103. The Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1828g (1976)).
104. The measure was part of the Glass-Steagall Act, but was enacted as CI.
89, § 11 (b), 48 Stat. 181 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371 (a) (1976)).
105. JT. CONE. REP. No. 254, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (to accompany H.R.
5661 which was enacted as The Banking Act of 1933, supra note 102).
106. See Comment, The Legality of Credit Unions Share Draft Accounts Un-
der Federal Law, 46 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1135, 1164-65 (1978).
107. The interest-bearing demand accounts that give rise to the interest rate
competition were in the main deposits of rural banks with urban ones, or de-
posits held by correspondent banks. The large majority of banks did not pay
interest on personal demand accounts. C. ALT, "CHANGING CHARACTER OF BANK
DEPOSITS," CHANGING ROLE Or BANKING 56 (Prochnow Sc Prochnow 1974). It was
not until after World War II that personal checking accounts became popular.
In fact, as recently as 1946, only about one-third of all households had checking
accounts. B. KLEBANER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE U.S., A HISTORY 176 (1974).
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It has been suggested that Congress may have acted hastily, and that
interest payments on checking account balances may have played an in-
significant part in the phenomenon of bank failures of the early 1930s.108
Nonetheless, the prohibition has become an entrenched feature of this
country's federal banking regulatory scheme and was relied upon by ad-
versaries of thrift institution checking services in early efforts to thwart the
development of those services.' 0 9
Commercial banks traditionally have dominated the field of ordinary
checking services,11 0 and while they continue to do so,'" that dominance
has never been complete. Thrift institutions have been offering ordinary
checking services at least since the 1860s.112 Some 228 mutual savings
banks offer demand deposit accounts," 3 state chartered savings and loan
associations are authorized to offer them in Maine, 1 4 Connecticut, 1 5 and
New York," 06 and state chartered credit unions have that authority in
Rhode Island 117 and Nevada." 8
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE AuTHOmR OF THUFT
INSTITUTIONS TO OFFER CHEcK-LIKE SERVICES
While certain thrift institutions have been offering checking account
services since before the turn of the century,"19 this offering primarily has
been a development of the last decade. As credit unions, savings and loans,
and mutuals have sought to develop check-like services, they have generated
a good deal of administrative activity in their governing state or federal
agencies. That administrative activity in turn has led to litigation which
in a number of cases has resulted in a legislative response.
Most regulatory activity in this area has involved credit unions, for
several apparent reasons. Savings and loan associations traditionally have
108. A. Cox, REGLATION OF INTEREsT RATES ON DEMAND DEPosrrs 21-25 (1966).
109. See Riordan, supra note 13, at 4-5.
110. The phrase "ordinary checking" services is used here to refer to demand
deposit accounts accessible by demand drafts rather than the "new checking"
service, in which a savings account is subject to access by a demand draft.
111. See note 2 supra.
112. See note 119 infra.
113. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, supra note 20, Table 26
at 23.
114. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-B, § 761 (West 1979).
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-182a (1979).
116. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 390.5 (McKinney 1979).
117. R.I. GEN. LAws § 19-21-9.1 (1978).
118. NEv. REv. STAT. § 678.470.1 (1975).
119. Metropolitan Savings Bank of Baltimore, which merged into the Savings
Bank of Baltimore in 1957, first started to offer checking account services to its
customers in 1869. See Savings Bank v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 461, 465, 237 A.2d
45, 47 (1968). La Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie, a New Hampshire credit union
chartered by that state, was the first credit union in the United States. It has been
offering its customers checking accounts since 1939. See La Caisse Populaire Ste.
Marie v. United States, 563 F.2d 505, 507-08 (1st Cir. 1977).
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been governed by statutes that prohibit checking services 120 and, for finan-
cial reasons, have not aggressively sought an expansion of their powers.12
Far fewer in number than either other category of thrift, 122 mutual sav-
ings banks also did not undertake any nationally coordinated effort to as-
sert or obtain checking powers. Credit unions, on the other hand, acting
through their trade association, 123 undertook a sophisticated national cam-
paign beginning in the mid-1970s to assert or obtain authority to offer
those services to members.
The initial activity of the decade involved mutual savings banks and
savings and loan associations. In 1970, Consumer Savings Bank of Wor-
cester, Massachusetts, 124 sought permission from the State Department of
Banking to offer customers a check-like service which the bank intended
to market under what was then its own trademarked designation NOW
accounts.125 On denial of the petition, an original action was commenced
in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which subsequently over-
ruled the banking commissioner. 2 6 At issue was the statutory language:
"The deposits in such corporation may be withdrawn at such time and
in such manner as .the bylaws direct."' 27 The court reasoned that the statute
"leaves the establishment of methods of withdrawal to the individual
banks."' 28
The Consumer Savings Bank case, which was preceded by two state
court decisions which approved checking services long offered by mutual
savings banks, 129 led to the adoption of similar "checking-like" services by
savings banks in neighboring New Hampshire, 3 9 and was further in-
directly responsible for federal legislative intervention. In 1973, President
120. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-1 (1979), which provides, "Savings accounts in
a federal association shall not be subject to check." See also RSMo § 369.209.1
(1978).
121. Evidently, there was concern early on in the savings and loan industry
that a likely trade-off for the industry's gain of "checkable deposit" powers would
be the loss of the quarter percent interest rate advantage the industry had over
commercial banks. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
122. A total of 465 mutual savings banks were in existence as of year end
1978. See note 20 supra.
123. The extent of the marketing campaign launched by Credit Union' Na-
tional Association and its technical assistance arm, I.C.U. Services Corp., can
best be seen in account growth. Since 1974, share-draft checkable accounts had
grown, by March 31, 1979, from zero to $1.2 billion, with over 1.32 million ac-
counts at 1327 credit unions. Credit Union National Association, Save Our Share
Draft Survey (Dec. 1979).
124. The earlier name of the bank, The Worcester Five Cents Savings Bank,
see text accompanying note 13 supra, was changed to Consumer Savings Bank in
1970. Riordan, supra note 13.
125. Consumer Say. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 282
N.E.2d 416 (1972).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 718, 282 N.E.2d at 417.
128. Id.
129. Savings Bank v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 461, 237 A.2d 45 (1968); Hudson
County Nat'l Bank v. Provident Inst. for Say., 44 N.J. 282, 208 A.2d 409 (1965).
130. Riordan, supra note 13, at 4.
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Nixon signed Public Law 93-100,131 a compromised bill permitting fed-
erally chartered thrift institution and commercial bank NOW accounts in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, but prohibiting the offering of that
service by those financial institutions in all other states, In 1976, the Act
was amended to permit interest bearing NOW accounts in the additional
northeastern states of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont.132
The Act was amended again in 1978 to extend NOW account authority to
New York,13 3 and in 1979 to New Jersey. 13 4 Because governing state law
in each of those northeastern states either already allowed state institutions
to furnish that service' 35 or permitted state thrifts to offer the same service
that federally chartered savings and loans were authorized to offer, 3 6
NOW accounts are currently available at state chartered institutions in all
eight-states as well.
Litigation concerning the authority of these two kinds of thrift insti-
tutions to offer check-like services since the Consumer Savings Bank case
has been sporadic. In Wisconsin Bankers Association v. Mutual Savings &
Loan Association, 37 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals approved a non-
interest bearing NOW account offered by a state chartered savings and
loan association. The court reasoned that the NOW account is not a
statutorily proscribed account since a NOW instrument is not a check.' 38
In Washington Bankers Association v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 30
the Washington Supreme Court approved a check-like service marketed as
a NOW account, but functionally different because the service involved
two accounts: a non-interest bearing account accessed by a negotiable
instrument, and a companion interest-bearing savings account. The lan-
guage of the Washington statute is somewhat unusual. A Washington
chartered mutual savings bank is expressly authorized to "pay . . . any
check drawn on it by a depositor."' 4 0 Therefore the court had little dif-
ficulty upholding the service.' 4 ' Finally, in Pennsylvania Bankers Associa-
tion v. Secretary of Banking,142 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a
131. Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. 93-100, § 2, 87 Stat. 342 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1832 (a)- (c) (1976)).
132. State Taxation of Depositories Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2,
90 Stat. 197 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (a) (1976)).
133. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XIII, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3641 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(1976)).
134. H.R. 4998, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. 1-112264, tit. I, § 107.
135. See, e.g., CONN. GE'N. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-104c, 36-182a (1979).
136. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 9-B, § 424 (1979).
137. 87 Wis. 2d 470, 275 N.W.2d 130 (1978), review granted, 87 Wis. 2d 917,
278 N.W.2d 280 (1979).
138. 87 Wis. 2d at 484, 275 N.W.2d at 134. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
may be mistaken on this point, at least insofar as Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C.
are involved. See text accompanying notes 220-238 infra.
139. 92 Wash. 2d 453, 598 P.2d 719 (1979).
140. WASH. REv. CODE § 32.12.020 (2) (1971).
141. 92 Wash. 2d at 458, 598 P.2d at 722.
142. 481 Pa. 332, 392 A.2d 1319 (1978).
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challenged Department of Banking regulation which permitted a uniquely
restricted negotiable instrument drawn on a mutual savings bank.143 The
court reasoned that it had a limited scope of review of the agency's action,
that the agency in fact had a mandate to promulgate rules providing "the
opportunity for institutions subject to [the Banking Code] to serve ef-
fectively the convenience and needs of their depositors,"'14 4 and that the
service provided was not prohibited by law. The only other cases involv-
ing savings bank check-like services to reach state appellate courts, both
holding thrift institutions to be without authority to offer such services,1 45
were effectively overruled by Public Law 93-100.146
By comparison, regulatory agency action regarding credit union check-
ing-like services has been almost frenetic. Trade organization activity
started in 1974 with representatives of GUNA approaching Herman Nicker-
son, Jr., the administrator of the National Credit Union Administration,
with a proposal for a pilot project under which a limited number of
federally chartered credit unions would offer "share draft" services to
members. 147 The proposal was in substance approved, 148 and in 1974 three
federal credit unions began share draft programs. The experimental pro-
gram, which by late 1977 had grown to include 514 federal credit unions,149
was viewed as a success by the participants and the agency, and on De-
cember 8, 1977, NCUA promulgated a permanent rule permitting the of-
fering of approved share draft programs by federally chartered credit
unions.' 5 0 A suit challenging the agency action was commenced two days
later by the commercial bankers national trade association.
In American Bankers Association v. Connell,15 1 the trial court found
authority for a federal credit union share draft plan in the "incidental
143. The regulation, 7 PA. BULL. 699 (1977), 10 PA. ADNnN. CODE §§ 30.1,
30.2, required a NOW instrument drawn on a Pennsylvania mutual savings bank
to state on its face that the savings bank reserves the right to require not less
than 14 days prior withdrawal notice before paying the instrument. See text ac-
companying notes 286-291 infra.
144. 481 Pa. at 338, 392 A.2d at 1323.
145. Androscoggin County Say. Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858 (Me. 1971);
New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 343 N.E.2d 735, 381
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975).
146. Both Maine and New York have since legislatively permitted NOW
accounts for state-chartered institutions, to avoid competitive advantage for fed-
erally chartered thrifts. See ME. REv. STAT. tit. 9-B, § 424 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y.
BANKING LAW §§ 234, 237, 238 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
147. Conversation with Ralph Swoboda, General Counsel, I.C.U. Services, Inc.
(Nov. 20, 1979).
148. Approval was granted pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1979) (permits cer-
tain experimental electronic funds transfer programs by credit unions).
149. American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 447 F. Supp. 296, 298 (D.D.C. 1978).
150. 12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (1979).
151. 447 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1978). An earlier action, American Bankers
Ass'n v. Montgomery, No. 76-1661 (D.D.C. 1976), was dismissed without prejudice
when the National Credit Union Administration agreed to undertake formal rule-
making proceedings. Id. at 298.
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powers" language of 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (15).152 The court found share
drafts to be merely a more efficient device by which a credit union can
offer withdrawal services, a variation on established and unquestionably
valid methods of accessing customer accounts. The court found the legis-
lative history at best equivocal, and the agency had a fully developed rec-
ord upon which to base its rulemaking. 53
Coincident with the federal administrative activity, a large number
of state regulatory agencies entertained requests by state chartered credit
unions for share draft authority. Such petitions resulted in temporary or
final administrative agency approval in Virginia,154 Connecticut,'" Okla-
homa,156 Pennsylvania,157 Illinois, 5 s Michigan, 59 and Florida.160 More
commonly, regulatory bodies sought advice of their state attorneys general
on the legality of share draft plans. Those opinions resulted in the ap-
proval of share draft plans in Ohio,' 6 ' Oregon, 62 North Carolina,163
Utah, 6 4 Texas, 65 Maryland, 166 Washington, 167 Montana, 168 and Ari-
zona.16 9 While the rationales underlying approval have varied, sev-
eral attorney general opinions have relied on the reasoning of the
152. The section provides: "A federal credit union shall have succession in
its corporate name during its existence and shall have power ... to exercise such
incidental powers as shall be necessary or requisite to enable it to carry on ef-
fectively the business for which it is incorporated."
153. 447 F. Supp. at 300-01.
154. Letter Order of the Virginia State Corp. Comm'n (Sept. 26, 1975).
155. Op. of the Connecticut Banking Comm'n (April 7, 1978).
156. Order of the Oklahoma Credit Union Bd. (Feb. 12, 1979).
157. Letter Order of the Pennsylvania Sec. of Banking (March 3, 1976).
158. "Share Draft Guidelines" (Oct. 1, 1977) (issued by the Director, Dept.
of Fin. Inst.).
159. Op. of the Comm'r of the Fin. Inst. Bureau (March 16, 1977).
160. Order of the Compt. of the Dept. of Banking and Fin., In re Leon
County Teachers Credit Union (Sept. 6, 1977).
161. Letter Op. of the Ohio Att'y Gen. to Eugene Conkle, Super. of Credit
Unions (Aug. 2, 1976).
162 Op. of the Oregon Att'y Gen. in response to Op. Request OP-3762 (Aug.
25, 1976).
163. Letter Op. of the North Carolina Att'y Gen. to William L. Cole, Credit
Union Adm'r (Oct. 28, 1975).
164. Letter Op. of the Utah Att'y Gen. to W.S. Brimhall, Comm'r of Fin.
Inst. (Sept. 10, 1975).
165. Op. No. H-1084, Att'y Gen. of Texas (Nov. 3, 1977).
166. Letter Op. of Maryland Asst. Att'y Gen. Ostendorf to William Wilson,
State Bank Comm'r (Oct. 31, 1977).
167. Washington Att'y Gen. Letter Op. No. 40 (1977). The regulatory ap-
proval given in both Washington and Montana covers a "share checking" plan.
In both states, relevant governing statutes provide that a credit union may not
"carry any . . . checking accounts." See MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 14-613(16)
(Supp. 1977); WASH. R.v. CODE § 31.12.260 (1978). The Montana and Washing-
ton plans differ from the ordinary share draft plan in that the credit union
"share checking" customer technically opens a separate checking account with the
collaborating commercial bank.
168. Letter Op. of the Montana Att'y Gen. to Kent Kleinkopf, Director, Dept.
of Business Reg. (March 30, 1978).
169. Op. of the Arizona Att'y Gen. 178-284 (Dec. 21, 1978).
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Massachusetts court in Consumer Savings Bank: the service is not expressly
statutorily prohibited, and the governing statute provides that a credit
union has such powers as its bylaws authorize. 170 Anticipating the ap-
proach used by the trial court in American Bankers Association v. Connell,
one state attorney general asserted a credit union's "incidental powers" as
the basis for approval.1"1
Attorney general opinions disapproving share draft plans have been
issued in Arkansas," 2 New Mexico, 173 and Idaho.174 While the rationales
have varied, they generally have focused on the absence of statutory au-
thorization. 175 The Arkansas opinion asserts that a share draft of the kind
involved is indistinguishable from a check, and credit unions in that state
are prohibited from offering checking services. 176
The administrative activity surveyed above sparked a flurry of liti-
gation and legislative activity. Administrative orders approving share drafts
were overturned by trial courts in Illinois and Oklahoma.177 In both cases
the absence of statutory authority for state chartered credit union share
draft programs was the basis for reversal. In Michigan, on the other hand,
administrative approval of share draft programs was upheld.'7 8 The court
found implicit legislative sanction in the fact that the legislature in 1976,
after credit unions had received administrative approval for share drafts,
significantly amended the Michigan Credit Union Act without treating
share draft services. 17
9
Appellate courts in two states have ruled on share draft plans, with
opposite results. The Iowa Supreme Court overturned a trial court's ap-
proval of a share draft plan. The court reasoned that since by case law
financial institutions in that state possess only enumerated powers, and
since the legislature had not granted credit unions the power they sought
to exercise, the plan was unlawful.' 8 0 In contrast, the Florida Court of
170. That rationale was expressed by state attorneys general in Maryland (re-
ferring to MD. CODE ANN. CoRP. Sc AssNs § 6-307 (1975)); North Carolina (referring
to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-109.53, .54 (1979)); and Utah (referring to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 7-9-6 (5) (Supp. 1979)).
171. The North Carolina Attorney General also based his opinion on the
"incidental powers" provision of the North Carolina Credit Union Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 54-109.22 (1979).
172. Op. No. 76-111 (Aug. 18, 1976).
173. Letter Op. of New Mexico Asst. Att'y Gen. Gardenhire to Herbert H.
Hughes, Comm'r of Banking (Dec. 8, 1976).
174. Letter Op. of Idaho Deputy Att'y Gen. Barchas to Tom McEldowney,
Director, Idaho Dept. of Fin. (Dec 2, 1976).
175. See New Mexico and Idaho Ops., notes 173 & 174 supra.
176. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-609(1) (Supp. 1979).
177. Illinois Bankers Ass'n v. Callahan, No. 77 L 22948 (Cir. Ct., Cook County,
Ill., May 17, 1979); Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Oklahoma Credit Union Board,
No. CD-77-623 (Dist. Ct., 7th Jud. Dist. Okla., June 28, 1979).
178. Michigan Bankers Ass'n v. Commissioner of Fin. Inst. Bureau, No. 77-
20045-AA (Cir. Ct., Ingraham County, Mich., Feb. 1, 1979).
179. Id. at 5-8.
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Appeals held that since the practice was not statutorily prohibited, it was
therefore permissible. Anticipating the logic used in American Bankers
Association v. Connell, the Florida court referred to credit unions' statu-
tory "incidental" powers.'S'
State legislative responses to the litigation surveyed has been definitive.
During 1979 sessions, legislatures enacted laws permitting credit union share
draft programs in Illinois, 8 2 Iowa,' 5 3 and Idaho,8 4 thus effectively over-
ruling agency or court action in those states. Bills specifically granting
share draft powers were also passed in Louisiana'8 5 and Georgia;' s0
two other states, Vermont' 87 and Tennessee, 8 8 passed similar measures
somewhat earlier.
. During the height of successful legislative activity, the credit union
campaign suffered what seemed a major setback: American Bankers Associ-
ation v. Connell reached the court of appeals where the district court hold-
ing was- reversed.' 8 9 Consolidated on appeal were two other cases involv-
ing trial court approval of regulations permitting expanded financial
services by banking institutions: automatic fund transfer services of com-
mercial banks,190 and remote service units by savings and loans.' 91 The
court of appeals struck all three regulations, stating:
This court is convinced that the methods of transfer author-
ized by the agency regulations have outpaced the methods and
technology of fund transfer authorized by the existing statutes. We
are neither empowered to rewrite the language of statutes which
may be antiquated in dealing with the most recent technological
advance, nor are we empowered to make a policy judgment as to
whether the utilization of these new methods of fund transfer is in
the overall public interest. Therefore, we have no option but to
set aside the regulations authorizing such fund transfers as being
in violation of statute'192
181. Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon County Teachers Credit Union, 359 So. 2d
886, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1979).
182. ILL. R.v. STAT. ch. 32, § 496.13 (8) (added by Laws of 1979, ch. 32 (1980)).
183. Iowa Acts ch. 130 (1979) (to be codified in IowA CODE ch. 533).
184. IDAHO CODE § 26-2108 (t) (1977).
185. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:644 (16), 6:652.1 (added by Laws of 1979, tit.
6, ch. 8 (1979)).
186. GA. CODE ANN. § 41A-3121 (Supp. 1979).
187. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 8, § 2054 (6) (1979).
188. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-1806 (6) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
189. American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 595 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (de-
cided under Local Rule 13 (c) without opinion; under Local Rule 8 (b), such a
decision may not be cited in briefs or memoranda of counsel as precedent).
190. U.S. League of Say. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 463 F. Supp. 342
(D.D.C. 1978) (Upheld amendments by the Federal Reserve Board to Regulation
Q 12 C.F.R. § 217.5 (c) (1979), and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
to 12 C.F.R. § 329.5 (c) (1979). The two regulations permitted automatic fund
transfer accounts at insured Federal Reserve member and non-member banks.).
191. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., No. 76-0105
(D.D.C. 1977) (approving a regulation by the FHLBB, 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1979),
permitting remote service units (RSUs)).
192. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
21
Wilson: Wilson: New Checks: Thrift Institution Check-Like Instruments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A subsequent petition for writ of certiorari was denied.19 3
The Connell court, in treating the matter as one of substantial public
interest and potential economic impact, stayed the effective date of the
judgment to January 1, 1980, to allow Congress to make necessary policy
judgments and, if appropriate, to rewrite the applicable governing sta-
tutes.10 4 On September 11, 1979, the House of Representatives passed and
sent to the Senate a bill specifically permitting federally chartered credit
unions to offer share draft services, and permitting federally chartered sav-
ings and loan associations and federally insured mutual savings banks to
offer NOW accounts.195 The Senate passed that bill in a heavily amended
form,06 but the House-Senate Conference Committee was unable to rec-
oncile the differences between the two measures. The two houses finally
agreed on yet another bill' 97 which approved share drafts, 98 Federal
Reserve member bank automatic transfer services,' 99 and savings and loan
association remote service units.2 00 The bill did not approve nationwide
NOW accounts, and limited expansion of that service to the addition of
savings and loan associations in New Jersey.2 01 The measure was effective
for only ninety days,2 02 but further federal legislation in early 1980 mak-
ing the provisions permanent is virtually insured.
Because of the passage of that bill, successful state litigation chal-
lenging thrift institution check-like services is now practically foreclosed.
A desire to protect state chartered thrifts from competitive inequality will
likely lead to identical powers being granted to those institutions. In addi-
tion, since the bill also grants to commercial banks interest-bearing check-
193. No. 79-278 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1979).
194. American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 595 F.2d 887, slip op. at 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
195. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 1828 (1979) (cited as
the Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1979). The bill amends the fol-
lowing provisions: 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976) (to specifically permit commercial
bank AFT accounts); 12 U.S.C. § 1882 (1974) (to specifically permit NOW ac-
counts nationwide); 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (b) (1) (1976) (to permit S & L remote service
units); and 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (1976) (to permit interest-bearing share draft ac-
counts). The expanded checking services were expressly limited by the amend-
ments to individuals, or in certain cases non-profit institutions.
196. In addition to the checkable deposits amendments contained in the
House bill, the Senate bill provided for the following: (1) gradual elimination of
interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits (Regulation Q); (2) certain
other expanded services by S & L's; (8) amendments to Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. ch. 41 (1976); (4) exemption from state usury law for certain residential
mortgage lenders; and (5) certain housekeeping amendments sought by the Comp-
troller of Currency. See S. REP. No. 868, supra note 66.
197. H.R. 4998, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H12264 (1979). The
measure was signed by President Carter on December 28, 1979. American Banker,
Jan. 2, 1980, at 1.
198. H.R. 4998, tit. I, § 103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rixc. H12264
(1979).
199. Id. § 101.
200. Id. § 102.
201. Id. § 107.
202. Id. § 104.
[Vol. 45
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ing account authority, by means of an interest-bearing account accessible
by check through a zero-balance checking account, the prospective litigants'
principal basis for dispute has been eliminated. The effect of this legisla-
tion, however, may go beyond eliminating major differences between com-
mercial banks and thrifts; the legislation also may have an impact on the
proper characterization of a draft drawn on a thrift institution for com-
mercial law purposes.
V. "NEw CHEcKs" AND THE UCC
The focal area of this article is the applicability of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to these "new checks." Are these instruments "negotiable"
as that term is defined and particularized by Article 3 of the UCC? The
question is surely an important one since the answer governs the status
of remote transferees. If an instrument is negotiable, a subsequent taker
may qualify as a holder in due course, immunizing him from ordinary de-
fenses the issuer may later assert. 203 If the instrument is not negotiable,
no transferee can qualify as a holder in due course. 20 4 Assuming negoti-
ability, the next logical question is whether the "new checks" are governed
as are ordinary commercial bank checks by the rather detailed collection
process set out in Article 4.205 Parts 2 and 3 of that Article establish a
tight time schedule for the collection and payment of checks, and impose
rather stringent liability on tardy banks.2 06 Finally, part 4 establishes the
framework of the bank-customer relationship, and provides certain basic
customer protections. The right of the customer to stop payment, 20 7 the
drawee bank's liability for improper payment 208 or improper dishonor,2 09
and the customer's access to paid items to review them for unauthorized sig-
natures or alterations2 10 may depend on the applicability of the pro-
visions in part 4.
A. Credit Union Share Drafts
1. Negotiability
While all thrift institution "checkable deposit" instruments present
the above questions to some degree, credit union share draft accounts
raise certain issues in bolder relief. Section 8-104 (1) of the Code establishes
four requirements for negotiability:
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
203. U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305.
204. U.C.C. § 3-202.
205. U.C.C. §§ 4-201 to 4-213. It should be noted here that non-negotiable in-
struments are also covered by the collection provisions of Article 4. See U.C.C.
§ 4-10o4 (g).
206. See U.C.C. §§ 4-202, 4-213, 4-302.
207. U.C.C. § 4-403 (1), (2).
208. U.C.C. § 4-403 (3).
209. U.C.C. § 4-402.
210. U.C.C. § 4-406.
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(b) contain an unconditional promise or.order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation
or power given by the maker or drawer except as au-
thorized by this Article; and
c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
be payable to order or to bearer.
Subsection (2) states that an instrument, if negotiable, must be either a
draft, check, note, or certificate of deposit, and defines each.211
The negotiability requirements of section 3-104 are elaborated upon by
other provisions in part I of Article 3. Section 3-105 defines unconditional
promises. An instrument which states on its face that it is governed by
another agreement cannot be negotiable. The instrument can, however,
be subject to implied or constructive conditions, and it can refer to
separate agreements. The official comment to this section states, "The
section is intended to make it clear that, so far as negotiability is affected,
the conditional or unconditional character of the promise or order is to
be determined by what is expressed in the instrument itself .. " That as-
sertion is a restatement of the timeworn characterization of a negotiable
instrument as a "carrier without baggage."21 2 The common share draft
makes no explicit reference to other conditions or agreements and there-
fore meets the requirement of unconditionality.
Section 3-108 defines a demand instrument. The general definition of
section 3-104 provides that a negotiable instrument must be payable either
on demand or at a definite time. Since no definite time for payment is
stated, the instrument is negotiable only if it is a demand instrument. The
section does not provide much help by identifying a demand instrument
as one "payable on demand," including "those payable at sight or on
presentation and those in which no time for payment is stated." In any
event, a common share draft, like an ordinary commercial bank check,
provides no time for payment and would qualify as a demand instru-
ment.2 13
211. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) provides:
A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is:
(a) a "draft" (bill of exchange) if it is an order;
(b) a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand;
c) a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgement by a bank of
receipt of money with an engagement to repay it;
(d) a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
212. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846).
213. The instrument may qualify as a "demand" instrument even though the
account it is being used to access is not a demand account. Since the 1930s, both
commercial banks and thrift institutions have largely been prohibited from pay-
ing interest on demand deposits. Regulation Q of The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System defines a "demand deposit" as any deposit "which is not
a 'time deposit' or 'savings deposit' as defined in this section," and defines "time
and savings deposits" as deposits, inter alia, which are subject to actual or optional
notice of withdrawal prerogatives of the depository institution of not less than 30
days. 12 C.F.R. § 217.1 (a)- (e) (1979). A credit union share draft account is mani-
festly not a demand account because it is usually subject to that notice of with-
[Vol. 45
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The general definition of negotiability also requires that the instru-
ment be payable either to "order" or to "bearer." An instrument is pay-
able to bearer if it is payable, without more, to the one who has possession
of it; it is payable to order if it is payable according to the particular
direction of a holder. Sections 3-110 and 3-111 define the two terms. A
common commercial bank check is an "order" instrument. Invariably im-
printed on the check is the language "pay to the order of." This language
is necessary. An instrument issued "Pay to John Doe," while transferable, is
not negotiable: it is payable only to John Doe, not the bearer (if one other
than John Doe), and not, so far as negotiability is concerned, according to
the instructions of John Doe. The point may seem an obscure one to the
uninitiated, but by a long line of cases construing these sections as well
as their predecessors, sections 8 and 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the "pay to" instrument is nonnegotiable. 214 Indeed, that result was ap-
parently intended in an early credit union share draft experiment.2 15
Credit union share drafts in current use, however, meet the requirements
of sections 3-110 and 3-111.
Section 3-119, entitled "Other *Writings Affecting Instrument," may
be of consequence to the inquiry concerning share draft negotiability be-
cause of a frequent credit union practice. Credit union share draft ac-
count agreements commonly contain a clause reserving to the credit union
a right to require advance notice of withdrawals.21 6 Arguably, an instance
might arise where a remote holder of a credit union share draft presents
the draft through ordinary channels for payment and finds the draft
dishonored, not because the draft was stop ordered or the customer had in-
sufficient funds on account, but because the credit union exercised its
option to require advance notice of withdrawal, and the customer failed to
comply. Section 3-119 (2) dispells any doubt as to the effect these
drawal requirement, both by agreement and by statute. The Code, however, re-
quires that the nature of a negotiable instrument be determinable from the in-
strument itself, without reference to separate agreements, and under that stand-
ard the share draft is a demand instrument. If that non-demand account/demand
instrument presents an apparent inconsistency, it is without significance. The fact
that a draft is not honored by a financial institution because it opted to impose
an extended notice of withdrawal requirement would no more affect the character
of the draft than its dishonor for insufficient funds. In either event, liability of
the drawer arises immediately upon notice of dishonor to him. See U.C.C. §§ 3-501,
3-502.
214. Such an instrument is still subject to Article 3. See U.C.C. § 3-805.
215. A "pay to" share draft offered by the John Deere Employees Credit
Union of Waterloo, Iowa, was the subject of litigation in Iowa Credit Union
League v. Iowa Dept. of Banking, 268 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1978).
216. The purpose of the right to require advance notice of withdrawal is to
prevent a liquidity crisis. An ordinary commercial bank, should it confront such
a crisis and be unable to pay checks on presentment, is faced with the singular
option of declaring insolvency. A credit union or other thrift institution on the
threshold of a severe cash flow problem, on the other hand, can impose the notice
requirement, suspend payments for the 30-day period, and subsequently reinsti-
tute payments, thus avoiding insolvency.
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agreements have on the negotiability of the draft. It states, "A separate
agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instrument."
While this result might at first glance seem curious, the rationale sup-
porting it is clear. The issuer of a check or draft does not guarantee pay-
ment by a third-party financial institution, but only that, upon the hold-
er's taking appropriate steps, 217 he will pay it. Indeed, a check drawn on a
nonexistent bank could still be negotiable.2 18 That a draft might not be
paid by a third-party financial institution owing to some underlying
separate agreement will not render it nonnegotiable.
A review of the foregoing sections and those less directly applicable2 19
leads to an unambiguous conclusion: credit union share drafts commonly
in use today are negotiable demand instruments. A determination as to
the precise character of the share draft-is it merely a draft ("an order"),
or is it in addition a check ("a draft drawn on a bank and payable on
demand")-will be answered in the next inquiry: What, for purposes of
the UCC, is a "bank"?
2. The Bank Collection Process
a. What is a "bank"?
The word "bank" is defined only in section 1-201 (4), which states,
"'Bank' means any person engaged in the business of banking." The com-
ment to this subsection is not helpful, 20 necessitating recourse to the con-
ventional statutory construction aids and other interpretative tools.
A word in a statute not used in a technical sense, in the absence of an
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, generally is to be accorded its
common meaning.22 1 The "common meaning" of a word is customarily
that attributed to it by a standard dictionary. 222 Webster's Third New In-
ternational Dictionary defines the word "bank" as "an establishment for
the custody, loan, exchange, or issue of money, for the extension of credit,
and for facilitating the transmission of funds by drafts or bills of exchange."
217. For provisions regarding presentment and notice of dishonor, see U.C.C.
§§ 3-501 to 3-508.
218. Such a draft would still meet the basic requirements of U.C.C. § 3-104 (1)(a)-(d) relating to negotiability.
219. Section 3-120, "Instruments 'Payable Through' Bank," provides that an in-
strument can designate a "payable through" bank. That section and the accom-
panying official comments explain that a "payable through" bank is not ordered
or even authorized to make payment on the instrument out of drawer's funds on
deposit, but is merely authorized "as a collecting bank through which present-
ment is properly made to the drawee."
220. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 1-201 (4) merely makes reference to
§ 191 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. That section provides: "In
this act, unless the context otherwise requires: . . . 'Bank' includes any person or
association of persons carrying on the business of banking, whether incorporated
or not."
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A credit union embarked upon a share draft program probably satisfies this
definition.
A standard secondary approach to statutory construction-recourse to
a pronounced legislative statement of purpose223-reinforces that con-
clusion. Section 1-102, adopted in all states without significant amend-
ment,224 states the drafters' purposes and rules of construction. The first
two provisions of that section offer guidance:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing com-
mercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
The nationwide development of a sophisticated checking-like service by
credit unions, and the recognition of that service in the market place and by
companion financial institutions, is precisely the "expansion of commercial
practices through . . . usage and agreement of the parties" which the
Code seeks to permit. With that declared legislative purpose in mind, it
becomes apparent that a credit union offering a share draft plan fits the
Code's definition of a bank.
In support of a contrary view, it might be argued that the language
of section 1-201 (4), which defines "bank" as "any person engaged in the
business of banking," implicitly means the business of commercial banking.
It also could be argued that a credit union may not be engaged in the
"business of" anything.2 25 By definition, a credit union is cooperative in
nature;22 6 the institutional structure is not-for-profit. 22 7 Only those joined
by a common bond,2 28 usually of employment, are entitled to participate. 22 9
Earnings not appropriately invested in expansion are periodically returned
to the membership. Although some credit unions have reached sizes
shadowing many commercial banks,23 0 most are small 231 and continue to
be operated informally.
223. Id. at §§ 48.01-.02.
224. Certain states did not adopt U.C.C. § 1-102 (5) relating to use of gender.
225. A variation on this analysis was used by the court in La Caisse Populaire
Ste. Marie v. United States, 563 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1977), in determining that a
credit union is not a bank for Internal Revenue Service purposes.
226. See, e.g., RSMo § 370.180 (1978); 12 U.S.C. § 1752 (1) (1976).
227. See, e.g., RSMo § 370.330 (1978); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1759, 1763 (1976).
228. See, e.g., RSMo § 370.080 (1978); 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1976).
229. See, e.g., authorities cited note 228 supra.
230. As of December 31, 1978, the Navy Federal Credit Union had total as-
sets of $765.5 million. See note 59 supra.
231. For example, of 194 state chartered credit unions in Washington state
as of December 31, 1978, 97 had total assets of less than $1 million. State of Wash-
ington Dept. of Gen. Admin., Div. of Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Roster of State Char-
tered Say. & Loan Ass'n and Credit Unions with Comparative Statements 7-11
(Dec. 31, 1978).
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While commercial banking is not statutorily defined, the phrase has
been subjected to judicial interpretation. In United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank,2 32 the Supreme Court asserted that the phrase described "a
congeries of services and credit devices," and in a footnote enumerated a
representative sampling of banking services. 233 The Court in Philadelphia
National Bank understandably did not intend its sampling of commercial
bank services to serve a precise definitional function. To determine the
character of a financial institution by a tally of the number and nature
of financial services offered would not be practical. 234 Nonetheless, it is
interesting to note that the personal financial services offered by a represen-
tative medium sized credit union with a share draft program approximate
those listed by the Court in Philadelphia National Bank.2 35 This rela-
tively wide scope of banking services provided by a credit union offering
share draft services is undoubtedly the rule rather than the exception; credit
unions with share draft programs tend to be, and are often required by
regulatory authorities to be, large, well-established, and professionally
operated.2 30
Interpreting "business of banking" to mean exclusively the business of
commercial banking flounders in view of the scant authority for the
proposition that the word "business" excludes cooperative ventures, or re-
fers to undertakings of a particular size or level of sophistication. In addi-
tion, a credit union should be regarded as a "bank" because the question
is whether, for Articles 3 and 4 purposes alone, a credit union offer-
ing share draft services is a "bank," not whether a credit union embarked
232. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
233. Id. at 326-27 n.5. The list included: unsecured personal and business
loans; mortgage loans; loans secured by securities or accounts receivable; automo-
bile installment and consumer goods installment loans; tuition financing; bank
credit cards; revolving credit funds, acceptance of demand deposits from indi-
viduals, corporations, governmental agencies, and other banks; acceptance of time
and savings deposits; estate and trust planning and trusteeship services; lock
boxes and safety deposit boxes; account reconciliation services; foreign depart-
ment services; correspondent services; and investment advice.
234. The scope of banking services offered by financial institutions of all
categories often will depend upon their relative sizes. Small rural commeicial
banks probably offer their customers fewer financial services than large urban
mutual savings banks.
235. A recent prospectus of such a credit union offered members the follow-
ing services: the making of unsecured and secured personal loans; the making of
real estate loans; the making of consumer installment loans; the offering of share
draft accounts; the sale of travellers checks and money orders; the offering of
financial counseling; the making of student education loans; the accepting of
time and savings deposits; the offering of safe deposit boxes; and the offering of
share and credit insurance. Prospectus of Spokane Teachers Credit Union, Spo-
kane, Washington (July 1, 1979). One might conclude, on some sort of sliding
scale evaluation, that this credit union is more nearly a "bank" than "not-a-bank."
236. See 12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (1976). Georgia law requires participating state
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upon a share draft program is a "bank" for every purpose under the law.2 7
Because share drafts are treated by other banks and by the Federal Reserve
System very similarly to ordinary checks, to construe the Code definition of
"bank" so as to exclude credit unions would likely give rise to a number of
serious legal problems, and would achieve no discernible useful social
policy. Nonetheless, thoughtful commentators differ,2 38 and the question
today could be characterized as fairy close. Judicial interpretation might
be helpful, but an amendment to section 1-201 (4), clearly including or ex-
cluding thrift institutions and others, would make the answer clear.
b. Collection
Article 4 of the UCC governs the collection and final payment of
checks, as well as the relationship between a customer and his bank. More
specifically, the article covers the collection and payment process as it
relates to what are called "items." The term is broadly defined in sec-
tion 4-104 (g) as "any instrument for the payment of money even though
237. It does not necessarily follow from the analysis in the text that a credit
union is engaged in the "business of banking" for other purposes. For example, the
following authorities are not dispositive in our narrow inquiry:(A) The definition of "bank" in The Bank Holding Company Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1841 (c) (1976): "[A]ny institution organized under the laws of
[the several jurisdictions of the United States] which (1) accepts deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) en-
gages in the business of making commercial loans."(B) The usual but narrow definition of the "business of banking" for the
purpose of chartering state commercial banks, as in Missouri: "[T]he
business of discounting bills, notes or other evidence of debt, of receiving
deposits, of buying and selling bills of exchange, or of issuing bills, notes
or other evidences of debt for circulation as money, or of engaging in
any other form of banking." RSMo § 362.420 (1978).
(C) The determination of what is a bank for the purpose of state "unit-
banking" or "branch-banking" regulations: Texas State Chartered Credit
Union operating draft withdrawal program is not a "corporate body with
banking and discounting privileges" within the meaning of the Art. 16, §
16 Texas constitutional prohibition against branch banking. Texas Bank-
ers Ass'n v. Government Employees Credit Union, No. 78-CI-4577 (Dist.
Ct., Bexar Co., Tex., Oct. 15, 1979).
(D) The "scope" or "reach section of the National Banking Act, 12
U.S.C. § 37 (1976), which provides: "The provisions of this chapter,
which are expressed without restrictive words, as applying to 'national
banking associations', or to 'associations', apply to all associations organ-
ized to carry on the business of banking under any Act of Congress."
238. Professor Fairfax Leary, the Reporter for Artide 4 during much of the
initial drafting stage, has suggested that the word "bank"' is used throughout the
Code in the more restricted sense, and refers to a financial institution chartered to
embark upon an especial undertaking. Thus, institutions organized under par-
ticular state or federal statutes relating to the chartering of ordinary commercial
banks are "banks." Institutions organized and chartered under statutes relating
to savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions remain,
in spite of their services, respectively savings and loan associations, mutual sav-
ings banks, and credit unions. This approach serves the function of maintaining
the traditional distinctions between these four kinds of financial associations. Re-
marks of Professor Fairfax Leary, 13th Annual Uniform Commercial Code Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1, 1979).
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it is not negotiable but does not include money." A section 3-104 (2) (b)
check is an "item" under this definition. Given the breadth of the defini-
tion, however, a credit union share draft qualifies whether or not it is a
check. A share draft will thus fit neatly into the collection scheme estab-
lished by Article 4, at least as it governs collection by depository239 and col-
lecting 240 banks.241 In fact, both the Federal Reserve System, through its
district banks, and the nation's commercial banks have cleared share drafts
in the fashion accorded checks for some time.242
Certain responsibilities and potential liabilities arise from a bank's
assisting in check collection under Article 4. It must use ordinary care and
act timely-usually within its midnight deadline 243-in sending, present-
ing, or settling for an item, and is liable for the amount of the item if
it fails to do so.244 It must indorse and guarantee prior indorsements and
must make certain warranties regarding the item on transfer and pre-
sentment.2 45 While a liability incurred under one of these sections or
239. "'Depository bank' means the first bank to which an item is transferred
for collection even though it is also the payor bank. . . ." U.C.C. § 4-105 (a).
240. "'Collecting bank' means any bank handling the item for collection ex-
cept the payor bank .... ." U.C.C. § 4-105 (d).
241. To facilitate appreciation of how a credit union share draft would be sub-jected to the Article 4 collection process requirements, the following tracing of
the collection of an ordinary commercial bank check is offered: Assume Jones, a
San Francisco resident, determines to buy an ermine-lined backgammon board
from Nieman-Marcus in Dallas. He sends them his check in payment, drawn on
San Francisco Bank, on December 1, 1979. On December 3 the check is received
by Nieman-Marcus in Dallas, and on December 4 the mercantile company de-
posits it in its bank, Dallas Bank. Dallas Bank sorts it out in a group of checks
drawn on banks in other Federal Reserve districts, and on December 5 forwards
it with those other items to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Dallas Bank
is given conditional credit for Jones' check, and FRB Dallas forwards the check
on December 6 to FRB San Francisco. On December 7 the check is presented to
and received by FRB San Francisco, which grants FRB Dallas a conditional credit
for the item. On December 10 the item is presented by FRB San Francisco to San
Francisco Bank. The latter then has until midnight of the day following present-
ment to honor or dishonor the item. It must give conditional credit the day of re-
ceipt, and ordinarily, should Jones have sufficient funds in his account, will
simply allow the "midnight deadline" to lapse, thereby becoming "accountable"
for the item, and "firming up" the sequential conditional credits already given in
the collection chain.
242. The Federal Reserve System undertook to assist in the collection of share
drafts as Regulation J (12 C.F.R. § 210 (1979)) "cash items" in 1974.
243. The midnight deadline ends the next banking day following receipt of
an item. See U.C.C. § 4-104 (1) (h).
244. U.C.C. § 4-103 (5). The section establishes as the measure of damages the
amount of the item reduced by an amount which could not have been realized
by the use of ordinary care.
245. Section 4-207, detailing implied warranties on transfer or presentment of
an item, is a lengthy but extremely important section of Article 4. Under the trans-
fer warranty, a collecting bank guarantees to immediate and remote transferees,
when it transfers an item and receives a settlement, that it has good title (i.e.,
that prior indorsements are regular), that the item has not been materially al-
tered or the drawer's signature forged, that it is immune to defenses on the item,
and that it is unaware of the drawer's insolvency. The presentment warranty is nar-
rower in scope but is made by all in the collection chain. Both collecting and pre-
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others246 often can be passed on,2 47 at times this is not possible and ,he
exposure is of some consequence. There appear to be no reasons for excusing
collecting banks from these responsibilities when share drafts rather than
checks are the subject of collection. Indeed, Federal Reserve Board regula-
tions which parallel Code collection requirements apply to share draft col-
lection.248
c. Presentment
In the collection of ordinary bank checks, the individual checks are
physically presented to the drawee bank which, after sorting and determin-
ing to pay them, cancels the checks and returns them to its customers. The
typical final stage of share draft collection, however, is different. The in-
strument is photocopied by the "payable through" bank, and the original
is then destroyed. Communication with the affected credit union concern-
ing its payment is handled electronically. Customers receive periodic state-
ments reflecting the payment of items indicating share draft number and
amount; they do not recover the paid item itself. The process, called
senting banks warrant to a payor bank or other payor who in good faith pays that
they have good title, no knowledge of a forged drawer's signature, and that the item
has not been materially altered.
Applying the presentment warranty provisions of § 4-207 to the collection of
share drafts might seem to present a conceptual difficulty because, under the
truncated collection process used, see note 241 supra, the paid share draft is kept
by the "payable through" bank, having been only electronically presented to the
payor credit union. If a credit union customer's account is recredited on discovery
of a forged indorsement, could the credit union recover from the "payable
through" bank for breach of a presentment warranty of good title? The answer
is probably yes. The section can be applied in this setting because whether a
credit union is a "payor bank" or not, it clearly qualifies as an "other payor."
Further, an electronic presentment qualifies as an appropriate presentment under
Article 3. See text accompanying notes 250-252 infra. The rather clear applica-
bility of the Code warranty provisions to banks collecting share drafts, however,
may have little practical impact. Because of the nature of credit unions, large
item share drafts are apt to be rare. A credit union recrediting a customer's ac-
count for a small unauthorized payment is likely to forego any claim against a
prior collecting bank because of the disproportionate expense. The applicability
of the presentment warranty to a "payable through" bank is probably of even less
practical consequence. A credit union seeking to recover on a presentment war-
ranty can and probably would skip the presenting "payable through" bank and
proceed against prior collecting banks, resulting in the discharge of the "payable
through" bank. See U.C.C. § 3-208. In fact, credit unions might enter into agree-
ments with their collaborating "payable through" banks exonerating them com-
pletely from warranty liability. Apparently such agreements, permissible under
§ 4-103, are in fact common.
246. E.g., conversion liability incurred for paying a draft over a forged in-
dorsement under U.C.C. § 3-419.
247. The U.C.C. § 4-207 warranty provisions, see note 245 supra, generally al-
low an action over against the prior bank in the chain of collection, as does
Federal Reserve System Regulation J (12 C.F.R. § 210.5 (b) (1979)).
248. Share drafts have received treatment as "cash. items" ("a check . . . or
falny other item payable on demand and collectible at par," 12 C.F.R. § 210.2 (i)
(1979)) since the inception of credit union share draft plans, and are thus subject
to the general Federal Reserve regulations concerning collection and handling
of demand instruments. 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-.14 (1979).
1980]
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"truncation," is not conceptually new, and commercial banks have for
some time indicated interest in adopting it.249
The problem in this area is that the act of presentment for payment,
a pivotal step in the collection process, generally evokes the notion of the
physical act of presenting the item. How, then, is presentment to take
place in a "truncated" collection process? While the Code is rather specific
in its requirement regarding time of presentment,250 it sets out no re-
quirements concerning manner or place. Section 3-504 defines presentment
as "a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the . ..drawee or
other payor by or on behalf of the holder." Because the balance of that
section, and section 3-505 ("Rights of Party to Whom Presentment is
Made") are permissive rather than mandatory, a party to whom the in-
strument is presented may require exhibition of the instrument, identifi-
cation, a signed receipt, etc., 25 1 but these rights may be waived. It would
appear that at least as far as presentment is concerned,2 52 the truncated
approach does not run afoul of the Code.
d. Payment
The final stage in the collection of demand items is the payment stage,
governed by sections 4-213, 4-301, and 4-302. These sections control pay-
ment of an item by a "payor bank," which the Code defines as "a bank by
which an item is payable as drawn or accepted."2 53 Given the assumption
that a credit union fits the Code's definition of a "bank," it will then fit
this definition: the share draft is an item payable as drawn by the credit
union.
Section 4-301 sets out a payor bank's responsibility once an item has
been presented to it for payment. By its midnight deadline, a payor bank
must either pay the item, return it, or send notice of dishonor of the item.
Failure to act timely will result in the payor bank becoming accountable,
generally to the presenting party, under sections 4-302 and 4-213, for the
amount of the item.
The truncation of the collection process involving share drafts does
not materially affect a credit union's ability to comply with this tight
time framework. Indeed, the advent of electronic data transmission capa-
bility which initially gave rise to the truncated collection process, also en-
ables the credit union and its "payable through" bank to comply with the
249. On March 31, 1980, some 23 commercial banks, including 8 of the
country's 10 largest, began a pilot test of check truncation sponsored by the
American Bankers Association. American Banker, Sept. 6, 1979, at 1. Truncation
was the subject of recent study by the American Bankers Association. AMERICAN
BANKERS AssoCIATION, CHECK SAFEKEEPING: A TASK FORCE REPORT ON CHECK
TRUNCATION (1978).
250. U.C.C. § 3-503.
251. U.C.C. § 3-505.
252. But see text accompanying notes 257-267 infra (discussion of U.C.C. §
4.406, the "bank statement rule").
253. U.C.C. § 4-105 (b).
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Code's requirements. 254 In any event, the time deadlines imposed by these
provisions and those imposed by other provisions of Article 4 can be
varied by agreement.2 55 Finally, banks commonly participate in an associa-
tion of banks formed for the purpose of clearing items-called a clearing-
house-which may by rule alter the midnight deadline.256
3. The Bank-Customer Relationship
The final area of inquiry is part 4 of Article 4, which deals with the
bank-customer relationship generally and certain customer protections spe-
cifically. Within part 4 the initial focus must be on section 4-406, the
"bank statement rule." That section protects the customer against im-
proper payment of forged or altered checks. It provides that the payor
bank must send or otherwise make available to its customer the cancelled
checks and an accompanying statement.2 57 The onus is then upon the
customer to discover and report forgeries or alterations within a reason-
able time,2 58 not to exceed stated outer limits. 25 9 If the customer fails to
report irregularities, he may not recover 260 unless he shows that his bank
lacked ordinary care261-a sort of "double contributory negligence" stand-
ard.
A result of truncated collection is the retention of the share draft by
the payable through bank. The participating credit union does not re-
cover the paid share draft, and of course it is not returned to the customer.
The credit union does not send its share draft customer a statement of
account accompanied by items paid in good faith. Instead, the customer
254. In fact, Federal Reserve Board Regulation J requires that "payable
through" banks comply with their own "midnight deadline" in paying items. A
"payable through" bank falls within the meaning of a "paying bank" under the
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 210.2 (k) (2) (1979); such a "paying bank" is under an ob-
ligation to pay or dishonor cash items presented to it for payment by midnight
of the banking day next following receipt of the item. 12 C.F.R. § 210.12 (a) (1979).
255. U.C.C. § 4-103 (1).
256. U.C.C. § 4-103 (2).
257. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1) provides:
When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied
by items paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the
statement and items pursuant to a request or instructions of its customer
or otherwise in a reasonable manner makes the statement and items avail-
able to the customer, the customer must exercise reasonable care and
promptness to examine the statement and items to discover his unauthor-
ized signature or any alteration on an item and must notify the bank
promptly after discovery thereof.
While the subsection does not literally require that a bank furnish its customer a
statement and the paid checks, the effect may be to impose that requirement; other-
wise the bank's liability for improper payment of a check under U.C.C. § 4-401
might be open-ended and of indefinite duration.
258. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1).
259. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (4) (usually one year).
260. U.C.C. § 4-406 (2) (a).
261. U.C.C. § 4-406 (3).
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will receive only a statement.262 The paid share drafts are photocopied by
the payable through bank and then destroyed. While a customer gen-
erally may obtain copies of these drafts upon request after complying with
his agreement with the credit union,263 the question remains: Does the
retention by a distant payable through bank of a copy of the item, avail-
able to the customer upon request, constitute making the statement and
items available to the customer in a reasonable manner?
264
The question is a problematic one, but given the ease with which a
customer can obtain a paid share draft-all he need do is identify the
item requested, pay the required fee,265 and the item will be sent to-him
for inspection-there appears to be ample support for truncation. Elimina-
tion of truncation would force credit unions to increase significantly share
draft account charges to customers.2 66 Further, the customer's need to
review cancelled checks for alterations and forgeries may not be terribly
consequential; the incidence of that kind of malefaction is extremely low.
Finally, a customer can detect in almost all instances apparent inappropri-
ate charges to his account by reviewing his periodic statement.
267
The balance of the "bank statement rule" presents questions which,
while of less practical consequence, are perhaps as thorny. Section 4-
406 (2) (b) articulates what has come to be called "the 14-day rule." In
settings where the same wrongdoer is forging or altering a customer's
checks, the customer has a maximum of 14 days after receiving the state-
ment and the first forged or altered item to notify his, bank of that forgery
or alteration. If the customer does not so notify his bank within that time,
262. A statement is required by regulatory authorities. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §
701.34 (c) (5) (viii) (1979), covering federally chartered credit unions.
263. Share draft agreements uniformly provide, either explicity or implicity,
for return of copies of paid items upon request.
264. The applicability of the "bank statement rule," U.C.C. § 4-406, is dis-
cussed at length in American Bankers Association, supra note 249, at 53-57. The
report contemplates the truncation of the check at the bank of first deposit, but
the delivery of an imaged (electronically reproduced) copy to the payor bank,
and the subsequent delivery to the customer of such an imaged copy. The report
further notes that following this procedure might well not satisfy the § 4-406 time
frames. Id. at 55.
265. Also required by regulatory authorities; see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (c)
(5) (xi) (1979). A charge of $.75 to $2.00 is usually rendered for furnishing a copy
of a paid item.
266. A useful, precise estimate of the collection cost of a non-truncated demand
item, including return of the cancelled check to the customer, is not generally
available; those costs differ depending upon the level of sophistication of check
processing used. One authority has placed the per item handling cost of a non-
truncated item at $.25-.30 and that of a truncated share draft at $.02-.16. Con-
versation with Ralph Swoboda, General Counsel, I.C.U. Services (Nov. 1, 1979).
267. The conventional share draft periodic statement contains the number,
amount, and date processed of paid share drafts. With that information and his
share draft payment records-which include carbon copies of share drafts issued-a
customer can detect payments that were wholly unauthorized or that were in
unauthorized amounts. He cannot, however, detect forged indorsements, nor can
he detect proper and improper payments should he lose his share draft booklet.
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he may not demand recredit for subsequent checks which were forged
or altered by the same wrongdoer, and paid prior to actual notification.
Truncation ought to excuse the customer from this accelerated reporting
duty, at least until he obtains a copy of that first forged item and is able
to positively identify the wrongdoing.
Section 4-406 (4) requires that a customer notify his bank of his forged
signature or any alteration within one year of his receipt of the statement
and items,2 68 and of forged indorsements within three years. Those time
periods represent statutory definitions of the outer limits of reasonably
prompt notification; they are not statutes of limitations.269 Since a cus-
tomer without serious difficulty may identify from his statement in-
stances of wrongdoing, the one year notice provision should apply equally
to share drafts. While a customer cannot review indorsements, this also
is of little consequence. Even where the item is returned to him for physical
inspection, he usually will not be in a position to identify forged indorse-
ments. Instead, he normally would rely on notification of the theft or
forgery by the prior holder. There appears no reason not to hold a share
draft customer to that same standard.
Finally, section 4-406 (5) requires that should a customer demand re-
credit because items paid were forged or altered, the payor bank must
raise whatever defenses it has concerning the timeliness of his notification,
or be barred from recovering against prior collecting and presenting banks
for breach of warranty.27 0 As noted earlier, application of the bank state-
ment rule to a credit union share draft customer may impose upon him, in
the accelerated reporting requirement of the 14-day rule, a burden he
cannot meet. It was suggested that the requirement might have to be re-
laxed. The thrust of subsection (5) is that the bank must raise against its
customer defenses to his demand for recredit that it has under that section.
In settings where the customer's reporting obligation is thus made less
stringent, a credit union's duty to raise that defense before pursuing claims
against prior collecting banks also would have to be relaxed.
4. Errata
A bank may charge a customer's account only with items that are
"properly payable." 271 Conversely, it may not pay items not properly pay-
able. These seemingly self-evident propositions are amplified in the Code
by sections governing improper payment 272 and improper dishonor.273 Sec-
tion 4-403 establishes the right of a customer to stop payment of an item
268. This one-year period has been reduced legislatively in some states to 60
days. See GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-4-406 (4) (1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-
406 (4) (Supp. 1978).
269. Billings v. East River Say. Bank, 33 A.D.2d 997, 307 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1970).
270. For a discussion of warranty liability, see note 245 supra.
271. U.C.C. § 4-401.
272. U.C.C. § 4-403.
273. U.C.C. § 4-402.
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before it is presented for payment, and assuming a credit union operating
a share draft plan is a "bank," that option is available to a credit union
customer as well.27 4 Indeed, the ordinary credit union share draft agree
ment usually includes a stop order option as a contractual customer right,
albeit sometimes only if the stop order is in writing and accompanied by
payment of a prescribed fee. Should a stop order be ignored, a credit
union presumably will incur liability to its customer for the amount of
damages the customer is able to show.2 75
Should a credit union dishonor a share draft improperly, it will in-
cur liability to its customer for damages caused by the dishonor,276 per-
haps including damage to the customer's good credit.2 77 Given, again, that
a credit union offering a share draft program is a "bank" for Article 4
purposes, there appears to be no reason to excuse such a credit union from
the operation of the "properly payable" rule and its related duties.
Section 4-407 provides a payor bank, which a credit union is now as-
sumed to be, with certain procedural protections against customer damage
claims that a paid item was properly stop ordered or otherwise not properly
payable.278 Under this section, sometimes referred to as the "double sub-
rogation rule," a bank that has paid such an item may place itself in the
position of an intermediate holder or holder in due course. If the customer
would have been liable to that intermediate party were they still holding
the instrument, his claim against his bank is defeated. Alternatively, the
section provides that should the bank choose to honor the customer's de-
mand that it recredit, it may assume the customer's position with regard
to claims he has against the payee or other intermediate holder, and recover
on those claims. Again, there appear to be no practical or conceptual
reasons for not allowing a credit union operating a share draft plan the
benefits of this section. Similarly, other provisions that round out the bank-
customer relationship ought properly to govern credit union share draft
programs.2 7 0
274.The National Credit Union Administration requires federally chartered
credit unions offering share draft services to allow a contractual stop order right.
12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (c) (5) (x) (1979). There is a strong argument that the stop
order provisions of § 4-403 accord stop order privileges to customers as a matter
of right, and therefore a separate customer agreement to pay a stop order charge
is unenforceable. U.C.C. § 4-403, Comment 2 provides:
The position taken by this section is that stopping payment is a service
which depositors expect and are entitled to receive from banks notwith-
standing its difficulty, inconvenience and expense. The inevitable oc-
casional losses through failure to stop should be borne by the banks as
a cost of the business of banking.
275. U.C.C. § 4-403 (3).
276. U.C.C. § 4-402.
277. Liability might be incurred if the dishonor is intentional, rather than
mistaken. Id.
278. E.g., a post-dated share draft.
279. U.C.C. § 4-405 (2) allows a bank to pay the checks of a deceased customer
up to 10 days after death. A credit union would probably find applicability of
this section to its advantage; in the absence of such a provision, there probably
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B. Other Thrift Institution "New Check" Services
1. Negotiability
"Checking-like" services have in the recent past been marketed under
a confusing welter of names. 280 The current standard denomination of a
mutual savings bank or savings and loan institution third party payment
instrument28 ' used to access a deposit is a negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW).282 NOW accounts are offered by both mutuals and savings and
loans. The only significant difference between a mutual NOW draft and
that of a savings and loan is that the former, like a credit union share draft,
is sometimes a "payable through" item,283 while a savings and loan as-
sociation NOW draft is customarily one drawn on the savings and loan
association itself.284
A mutual savings bank NOW draft carrying a "payable through"
bank is susceptible to the same analysis given a credit union share draft.
Issued in the same form and relevant particulars as a share draft, it meets
the applicable provisions of part 1 of Article 3 of the Code, and qualifies
as a negotiable demand draft. A savings and loan association NOW draft
drawn on a "payable though" bank is of course subject to that same
analysis. A NOW draft drawn on a mutual savings bank or savings and
would be a question as to the authority of a credit union to pay any deceased cus-
tomer's share drafts even were it without notice of death.
Both §§ 4-405 and 4-404, relating to a bank's optional payment of checks over
six months old, alone in Article 4, use the term "check," rather than item."
Because the conclusion has been reached that a share draft fits the Code's definition
of a "check"-a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand-the two sections
also would apply to credit unions.
280. The marketing names include at least the following: NOWs (negotiable
orders of withdrawal, usually on an interest-bearing account); WOWs (written or-
ders of withdrawal, non-transferable, drawn on a non-interest-bearing account, of-
fered by some thrifts in the early 1970s but now rare); POWs (payment orders
of withdrawal, on a non-interest-bearing account); and NINOWs (non-interest-
bearing negotiable orders of withdrawal).
281. Recall that some thrift institutions have been offering ordinary demand
deposit accounts since before the turn of the century. See note 119 and accom-
panying text supra.
282. A "NOW account" was itself initially a trademarked marketing name of
Consumers Savings Bank, Worchester, Massachusetts. Probably because it was
both the first and most widely publicized denomination given a negotiable in-
strument used to access an interest-bearing account, the name has gained wide-
spread trade, public, and even judicial recognition.
283. See note 8 supra. For a period of time in 1978 a number of New York
mutual savings banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System, see note
9 supra, offered automatic fund transfer accounts (AFT) authorized for com-
mercial banks by a 1978 amendment to Regulation Q. 12 C.F.R. § 217.5 (c) (2)
(1979). Apparently, the service was authorized under the rationale that Regula-
tion Q governs not just commercial banks, but all federal reserve "member"
banks, a category which might include a mutual. Most of these thrifts withdrew
the offering in favor of the more direct NOW accounts when 12 U.S.C. § 1832
(1976) was amended November 10, 1978, to permit NOW accounts in New
York. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, Mutual Savings Banking:
May 1979 Annual Report of the President 18 (1979).
284. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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loan association is even more manifestly a negotiable demand item. In all
respects, save that it is drawn on a thrift institution, such an instrument
appears identical to a standard commercial bank check. As is the case with
a share draft account, NOW accounts customarily are subject by statute
or bylaw to the right of the thrift institution to impose a notice of with-
drawal, usually thirty or sixty days. But as with share drafts, while the
subjection of the account to that notice of withdrawal requirement may
mean that the account is not a demand deposit account, the requirement
does not affect the character of the instrument itself.2 8 5
There exists an exception to the standard thrift institution check-like
instrument. In 1977, the Pennsylvania Department of Banking issued regu-
lations allowing state chartered savings banks to offer NOW accounts,
provided each draft bore a legend reserving to the bank the right to re-
quire fourteen days advance notice of withdrawal.2 8 6 The regulations were
challenged by a state association of commercial bankers, and subsequently
upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as within the delegated au-
thority of the State Secretary of Banking.28 7 In language that was argu-
ably dicta, the court characterized the legend-bearing instrument as a
"time" rather than a "demand" instrument.288 This characterization is
probably incorrect. It is true that the holder of such an instrument (or
of any other thrift institution instrument subject by separate agreement to
an advance notice of withdrawal requirement) might have to wait a period
of time if the institution exercised its notice of withdrawal right and the
holder chooses to seek payment from that institution. That holder, how-
ever, immediately upon dishonor could demand payment of the drawer,
as if the instrument had been dishonored because of insufficient funds
or a stop order. A time instrument is defined by the Code as one
payable at a definite time; 28 9 a demand instrument is one payable on
demand or in which no time for payment is stated.290 The Pennsylvania
court's incorrect characterization has apparently caused some administra-
tive problems affecting the clearing of thrift check-like instruments. 29 1
285. See note 213 supra.
286. Pennsylvania Bankers Ass'n v. Secretary of Banking, 481 Pa. 332, 392
A.2d 1319 (1978).
287. Id. at 336-37, 392 A.2d at 1321.
288. Id. at 338, 392 A.2d at 1322. The apparent reasoning behind that con-
clusion, although not made explicit in the opinion, was one of disclosure: Should
a depository institution demand of its customers advance notice of withdrawal,
holders of outstanding instruments should know that the instrument would not
be payable by the institution until the notice period runs.
289. U.C.C. § 3-109.
290. U.C.C. § 3-108.
291. On April 18, 1979, the Federal Reserve Board requested comment on
Federal Reserve System handling of NINOWs, and other "check-like payment
instruments." Participation by the federal reserve in the collection of thrift in-
stitution check-like instruments is pivotal to thrift institutions' continuing to offer
checkable deposit services to their customers. The problem the Pennsylvania
courts opinion poses is that if a Pennsylvania NINOW instrument is a time
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2. Collection
The Code's definition of a "bank ' 292 was subjected to extended
scrutiny earlier in the context of whether a credit union offering share
draft accounts fit that definition for the purposes of Articles 3 and 4.293
The conclusion, expressed with limited misgivings, was that a credit union
fits that definition. A thrift institution offering a NOW account satisfies
that definition even more completely. Not only do mutual savings banks
and savings associations meet the formal definition of the word "bank" as
derived from the usual approaches to statutory construction, but the prac-
tical reasons for so denominating them under the Code are even more
compelling. These institutions are substantially larger than credit un-
ions,2 94 and are uniformly operated by professionals. Many have offered
checking services for years, and the panoply of other banking services
offered easily exceeds that of credit unions.
If a mutual savings bank or savings and loan association is a "bank"
as that term is defined in the Code, and if it is a payor of negotiable
drafts drawn on it, then it follows that it qualifies as a "payor bank"205
as that phrase is used throughout Article 4. Similarly, if such a thrift in-
stitution qualifies as a "bank," and the NOW draft drawn on it is a de-
mand draft, then that draft is a "check." 29 6
VI. CONCLUSION
This article does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the Code's
applicability to innovative withdrawal schemes. Sophisticated technological
advances, coupled with increasing consumer demand for less expensive and
more liberal account access, have produced a variety of diverse new "check-
able deposit" plans. The advent of electronic funds transfer and trunca-
tion of the collection process has effectively revolutionized the types of
services customarily available in the banking industry.
New developments in the area are not limited to new account ac-
cessing schemes made practical by more sophisticated electronic technology.
Other financial intermediaries are beginning to offer services that allow
instrument, it is probably not eligible for federal "cash item" treatment under
Regulation J. "Cash items"--checks and other items payable on demand and col-
lectible at par, see 12 C.F.R. § 210.2 (i) (1979)-are handled and processed within
the Federal Reserve System by computer. "Non-cash items" are items that by
definition require special handling, see 12 C.F.R. § 210.2 (j) (1979), a practical
impossibility given the volume of thrift institution "check-like" instruments.
292. U.C.G. § 1-201 (4) ("any person engaged in the business of banking").
293. See text accompanying notes 220-238 supra.
294. Seven percent of the mutual savings banks in this country have deposits
in excess of $1 billion; 25% have deposits in excess of $300 million. National As-
sociation of Mutual Savings Banks, 1979 National Fact Book of Mutual Savings
Banks, Table 8 at 15 (1979).
295. "A bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted." U.C.C. §
4-105 (b).
296. This conclusion has been concurred in by at least one authority. See
H. BAILEY, supra note 7, § 1.17.
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customers access to funds with check-like instruments. Two major invest-
ment brokerage firms now provide customers with a "checking-like" service
using "payable through" commercial banks quite similar to the credit
union share draft service.2 97 Whether such an investment firm thus em-
barks on the "business of banking" for Code purposes presents an obvious
question which shall not be essayed here.
The principal inquiry in this article has been into the character, for
purposes of negotiable instruments law, of the major new account ac-
cessing methods developed by financial intermediaries in the last decade:
credit union share drafts and other thrift institution NOW instruments.
Both have fairly burst upon the market place within the last few years.
Widespread use of the instruments has made their precise character of major
importance, affecting the rights of persons who issue or accept them as
well as financial institutions on which they are drawn. A careful analysis
of these instruments under Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code has led to the conclusion that they satisfy the requirements for ne-
gotiable demand items and are in fact checks as that term is used in the
Code. That conclusion is based upon a determination that thrift institu-
tions offering these particular withdrawal modes are "engaged in the busi-
ness of banking" for Articles 3 and 4 purposes.
Certain problems attending the conclusion that thrift institution
"check-like" instruments are in fact checks have been examined, perhaps
most importantly the application of section 4-406, the "bank statement
rule," to credit union share drafts. With truncated collection, the paid
297. The investment firm Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith has under-
taken a customer offering marketed under the name "Ready Assets Trust." A
feature of the offering is a procedure whereby:
[A shareholder] may redeem shares by check in an amount not less than
$500. At the shareholder's request, the Bank of New York, the Transfer
Agent, will provide the shareholder with checks drawn on the custody
account of the Trust with its Custodian. These checks can be made pay-
able to the order of any person in any amount not less than $500. The
payee of the check may cash or deposit it like any check drawn on a bank.
When such a check is presented to the Transfer Agent for payment, the
Transfer Agent will present the check to the Trust as authority to re-
deem a sufficient number of full and fractional shares in the shareholder's
account to cover the amount of the check.
MERRILL, LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, RE ADY AssETs TRUST PRosPEcTus
15-16 (May 29, 1979). E. F. Hutton has developed a similar offering, marketed
under the name "Cash Reserve Management." As with the Merrill Lynch offer-
ing, shareholders are permitted to draw checks against shares in an amount not
less than $500, using New England Merchants Bank as a collaborating commercial
bank. E. F. HUTrON, CAsH RESERVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PRosPECrus 12 (March
23, 1978). In both cases the instruments utilized are "payable at," rather than
"payable through" the participating commercial bank, but in both form and
substance the investment firm itself appears to be the drawee, with the com-
mercial bank serving the function of assisting in the collection of the instrument
and presenting it to the investment firm for payment. The instruments used are
similar to credit union share drafts, and may well be subject to the same analysis.
But see U.C.C. § 3-121.
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share draft is not returned to the customer, as section 4-406 contemplates a
check will be. The Code provides in section 4-103 for variation by agree-
ment of the parties in the effect of provisions of Article 4. The benefit to
a customer in receiving paid checks, so that he might examine them for
wrongdoing and retain them for proof of payment or other purposes, is
not inconsequential, however, and the question of whether such a customer
has "agreed" to waive return of checks by signing a multiple provision
boiler contract on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis is problematic. On the other
hand, credit union share draft truncation may be precursive of collection
developments in the entire banking community, and it does bring with it
certain cost savings which are passed on to customers.
A single overriding consideration compels the conclusions reached.
The Uniform Commercial Code, perhaps one of the most tightly knit and
carefully drafted of the various uniform laws, was designed to be a flexible
system of rules that were accommodating to new developments in the com-
mercial or banking market place. To view thrift institution "check-like"
instruments as falling without the Code would be to view it as a strait
jacket requiring or inviting amendment on the occasion of each market
innovation, perhaps on a disorganized state-by-state basis. Such a result
surely was not contemplated by the Code's drafters.
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